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Chapter 1: Introduction 
China has transformed from a post-colonial, isolationist developing country into one of the most 
influential nation-states on the planet. The Chinese economy has experienced incomparable 
growth in recent decades with an ever increasing influence on global trade, economy, finance, 
politics, and cultural development. After its economic growth rate peaked at 14% in 2007, the 
world’s second largest economy now faces an important transition. Until just recently, China's 
economic 'miracle' has successfully paralleled its drive for modernization based on a Three-Step 
Development Strategy. According to China’s official policy, the strategy has to be carried out as 
follows (CIIC, 2014): 
 
“China's overall economic construction objectives were clearly stated in the Three-Step 
Development Strategy set out in 1987: Step One--to double the 1980 GNP and ensure that the 
people have enough food and clothing -- was attained by the end of the 1980s; Step Two--to 
quadruple the 1980 GNP by the end of the 20th century --was achieved in 1995 ahead of schedule; 
Step Three--to increase per-capita GNP to the level of the medium-developed countries by the 
mid-21st century--at which point, the Chinese people will be fairly well-off and modernization 
will be basically realized.” 
 
China is currently in the last, and arguably the most difficult, step in the Three-Step Development 
strategy. The success of this last step is a determinant not only for ensuring social stability, the 
core objective of the Communist Party’s authoritarian governance of China, but also for the entire 
structure of international relations. As the Three-Step Development Strategy shows, this is to be 
achieved through the continuous improvement of the living standards for the Chinese population. 
This report provides a comprehensive review of the implementation of the third and last step of 
the strategy to ensure this objective. To this end, the following question will be answered:  
 
Will China succeed in transforming its economy from a fixed asset investment and export-led 
growth model to a consumption-based economic model driven by its domestic economy? 
 
Outline 
Given that China is the most populous nation on Earth, this report will not give a detailed review 
of its economic development. The level of diversity from province to province makes a more 
generalized approach the only feasible option. The report, therefore, seeks to find overall trends 
in key issues, although with some inclusion of the development diversity factor when essential for 
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analysis quality. Furthermore, this report does not cover all obstacles on the road to China's 
economic transition. This means that the report will focus less on the social and political 
consequences for implemented reforms, and more on the key hurdles that the researchers of this 
report found relevant to China's transition.  
 
These hurdles fall into three sections: 
1. The overall macroeconomic and financial framework of China. 
2. Major socioeconomic factors and their relationship to China’s development. 
3. An analysis of the need for reforms in areas supporting China’s development. 
 
In each of these sections, an outline will be provided regarding the major problems within these 
fields after which an analysis will be given on how this will impact China's economic transition. 
These findings will be combined in the conclusion in which a definitive answer will be given to 
this report’s primary question regarding China’s economic future. 
 
Theoretical orientation 
This research paper will analyze China’s economic policy. Each chapter will be analytically 
descriptive in order to study the link between policy and its real world impact. The problem with 
this approach is that each chapter has different criteria for the success or failure of government 
policies and varying levels of data availability; furthermore, each chapter is quite distinct in 
nature, making direct comparisons across topic areas difficult. In order to cope with these 
differences, each chapter will receive its own individual policy analysis, and the success or failure 
of these policies will be balanced against one another in the conclusion. This inclusive approach 
toward this research area produces more of a policy study rather than strict policy analysis.  
 
Within the field of policy studies, this research will use a rational model in which the behavior of 
the state (in this case a unitary actor) is dependent on constraints and limitations (Simon, 1976). 
In the rational model, the consequences of policy choices are analyzed and compared to 
alternatives. This is exactly what this research paper tries to do: it looks at current Chinese policy 
and analyzes the shortfalls against what is actually needed. In short, the policy study will 
encompass a policy analysis in each chapter that roughly follows the following process: analyze 
the problem, determine what is needed to solve said problem, and describe China’s current 
attempts at ameliorating the issue. Every chapter, however, structures this approach a little bit 
differently based on the available data and to enhance the quality of the policy analysis. When 
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each of the policy analyses are combined, the major hurdles or choking points for China's 
economic transition can easily be deduced. 
 
Research constraints 
As stated above, this report uses a very narrow lens with which to analyze China's economic 
transition. This lens allows for generalizations regarding China's continental economy (a tricky 
proposition). This restricts the research, however, since even a 70-page research report does not 
do credit to China's massive economic structure. Important to note, therefore, is that this report 
looks at macroeconomic policies, financial trends, and other major socioeconomic trends rather 
than an in depth grassroots analysis.  
 
A problem with this method, however, is that it is a very clinical approach to a very complex 
issue. No economy exists within a vacuum even though this report treats it as such. Outside 
factors such as Sino-US relations or other issues beyond China's control are not taken into 
account in this report. Domestic factors such as the rise of nationalism, which could influence 
China's policymaking ability, are also left outside of the scope of this research. In other words, 
this report does not take into account political or social (domestic or international) ripple effects 
that could influence China's ability to enforce its transition.  
 
The final constraint is that there is a problem with the validity of data provided by the central 
government. Since data from the Chinese government is often published with a clear political 
motive, this leads to question the accuracy, reliability, and validity of said data. Since this report 
is analyzing trends as opposed to a definite economic analysis, this should not be an issue. 
Furthermore, where possible, data from other more reliable sources will be used to crosscheck the 
Chinese data. Another aspect that poses difficulty for this report is the vagueness of China's 
policy and its commitment to formal plans. China as an authoritarian state keeps policy plans 
abstruse and vague which leaves a lot of room for guesswork. 
 
The combination of these constraints suggest that if the same style of report would be done in, for 
example, two years, the end result might vary quite dramatically. In order to alleviate this 
discrepancy, experts from various fields, consultancy companies, and research reports from 
reputable institutions that provide future projections will be incorporated in this report's research.  
 
Findings 
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Our research concludes that China will be able to make the economic transition. There are, 
however, concerns with the quality and sustainability of the post-transition economic model. The 
government seems to lack commitment to a high quality sustainable growth model in the areas of 
socioeconomic development and supporting reforms. This leads us to believe that the quality of 
transition will be low and China's ability to sustain the post-transition model is in question. This 
opens up new fields of research that could analyze this possible post-transition model as well as 
the social stability of China's post-transition society.   
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Chapter 2: China's Economic Difficulties 
The key aspects that would allow China to transition into a consumer based society are reforms in 
both the financial and macroeconomic sectors. According to the International Monetary Fund 
(2011a), China’s financial sector is generally healthy but facing, “a steady build-up in 
vulnerabilities,” with IMF Deputy Director of Monetary and Capital Markets Department 
Jonathan Fietcher saying, “China’s banks and financial sector are healthy, but there are 
vulnerabilities that should be addressed by the authorities.” Viñals and Singh (2011), their IMF 
report, included the following risks: “growing disintermediation by shadow banks and off-balance 
sheet exposures; a downturn in real estate prices; and the uncertainties of the global economic 
scenario.” Not only the financial sector is at risk; China's growth model is also vulnerable during 
its economic transition. The current system of state-ownership needs to be reformed: labor costs 
in China continue to rise at 10% annually (Orr, 2014) while the return on assets is less than half 
of private companies (Budimaan et al, 2009). In order to deal with these rising costs and continue 
economic transition, the only option is reforming its entire economic growth model to allow for 
more of a market orientation.  
 
The problem with analyzing both the financial and economic sectors is that China is largely still a 
planned economy, and is often been seen as a black box. Information given out by government 
leaders is often intentionally vague and abstruse; a promise made does not ipso facto mean it has 
to be kept. It is likely only months and years later, after policies have been implemented, that 
their effects can be seen and policy statements properly interpreted. With that in mind, this 
chapter aims to open the black box and analyze China’s recent economic developments and 
predict future trends.  
 
Section 2.1: Financial market reform 
With China’s economy likely overtaking the US’ as the largest in the world sometime this 
century, likely within the next two decades, everyone has kept an eye on recent developments, 
progress, and possible risk areas within the Chinese financial sector. The drive for financial 
reforms is a process that has been going on for several decades; Viñals and Singh (2011) analyzed 
some of China’s recent reforms and generally sees them as having a positive effect on China's 
economic transition possibilities (p. 1). Many of these reforms began after 2003 during the Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao era. According the Financial System Stability Assessment (Viñals & Singh, 
2011), the primary goals during this era were to, “enhance [the] financial sector’s resilience,” 
while also, “strengthening . . . financial institutions and improving market confidence” (p. 1).  
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There are still weaknesses in China's financial sector that need to be addressed in order for 
China's transition to succeed. The Financial System Stability Assessment (Viñals & Singh, 2011) 
had a number of recommendations to generally address these weaknesses including the continued 
commercialization of the financial system, allowing the market to influence money markets, 
increasing government regulation, creating a stronger financial framework that would be able to 
withstand normal shocks and corrections, and furthering support for insurance programs among 
others (p. 1). More specifically, Viñals and Singh (2011) urged Chinese authorities to allow the 
market to determine both the Yuan exchange rate as well as banking interest rates (p. 18). While 
there is no overall consensus on the likelihood of China overcoming said financial challenges, it 
can be agreed upon that there are several obstacles that could impede China's economic transition. 
Next to these factors, analysts are also concerned about the levels of local debt. This could prove 
to be a major destabilizing factor that needs to be addressed in China's drive toward economic 
reform.  
 
The four biggest financial stumbling blocks for China this report has identified are as following: 1) 
the liberalization of the interest rate; 2) reform in currency and exchange rates; 3) the problem of 
shadow banking; and 4) local debt. 
 
2.1.1: Interest rate liberalization 
The liberalization of Chinese interest rates is seen to be the main solution for China’s financial 
challenges in general. It is also the most secure and profitable model for Chinese citizens looking 
to either deposit or lend money. In order to determine how China is approaching this task, it 
makes sense to visit a few of the financial issues that the country is facing. It is necessary to 
understand the differences between how China handles its interest rates compared to common 
financial policy in other countries. When you deposit money in a bank, the bank promises to pay 
you a certain amount of interest on that money. The bank then lends the money out to others at a 
higher interest rate. This is part of the bank’s profit margin. In just about every country, the 
“prime” interest rate is manipulated by a central bank. But in China, all the rates are controlled; 
both the deposit rate and lending rate. This has made depositing in banks unattractive for major 
business investments, wealthy Chinese, as well as the average Chinese citizen. This is aggravated 
by recent high economic growth in China. The following inflation has made the profits on 
deposits diminish as deposit rates are matched by inflation rates. 
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Figure 2.1: China’s annual GDP growth rate, (www.tradingeconomics.com, 2014) 
 
The decline in China’s annual growth has accommodated or dampened the inflation. Still, the 
rigid interest rates and the expected marginal return make bank deposits unattractive. As the 
banks have sought to find a way to reverse this trend, the quest for higher interest rates has 
allowed for the spread of shadow banking. This issue will be analyzed later in this chapter.1 
 
The International Monetary Fund’s consultation report (2011a) also had quite a few 
recommendations. For starters, the Chinese government must push for a more modern, more 
diverse financial system allowing for market-based control over interest rates and other financial 
figures, and that these changes would require a stronger Yuan (p. 1). Though the IMF was 
reticent to make any major recommendations, saying, “There is no optimal, predetermined path 
that financial liberalization and reform should take in China and any plan should be flexible 
enough to adapt to unforeseen situations as reforms proceed,” they in general still recommend, 
“appreciating the Yuan, absorbing liquidity and strengthening monetary management, improving 
regulation and supervision, developing financial markets and products, liberalizing interest rates, 
and finally opening up the capital account” (p. 24). As reported by Xinhua News Agency (2014c), 
some of the announced reforms by the government include the, “implementation of a proactive 
                                                          
1   There are two types of shadow banking in play in China. A smaller share falls under the category 
Microlending. In simple terms, this is non-banks—private people—lending money at high interest rates to 
other people who cannot get loans from the banks. The potential for systemic harm is smaller than wealth 
management products; the only loss is to another private person. Since the scope is also smaller, this type 
of shadow banking is not a focus in this report. 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
 
P a g e  | 11 
fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy,” also laid out some goals the Chinese government 
will set for itself during 2014 including, “granting financial institutions more power to set their 
own interest rates,” and “promote the healthy development of Internet finance.”   
 
The awareness of the risk in liberalizing the banking sector is evident. After the closing meeting 
of the second annual session of China's 12th National People's Congress, Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang addressed the issue with a metaphor: "We are a developing country, but this is what we 
have to do, and we cannot let today's stepping stone become tomorrow's stumbling block" (Lui, 
2014b). However, the process has clearly begun. In connection with the Congress, Li Keqiang 
announced that China will establish a deposit insurance system. This is a crucial factor in 
liberalizing deposit rates as a part of general interest rate liberalization (Lui, 2014a). In November 
2013, clues were provided by President Xi Jinping who said that “the core issue is properly 
handling the relationship between the government and the market” (as cited in: Buckley, 2013). 
Debates emerged whether these political statements were to be seen implemented (Buckley, 
2013). It seems that China is ready to put words into action in order to ensure liberalization by a 
China-trademark controlled process. Also during the second annual session of China's 12th 
National People's Congress, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, said 
he expected that the to remove its ceiling on bank deposit rates as early as next year. He stated 
that this “final liberalization of deposit rates is the last step of interest-rate marketization” (Gough, 
2014). 
 
To summarize, China desperately needs to liberalize its economy and let market influences take 
the place of government plans. A report by McKinsey& Company (2006) noted that at that time, 
“increasing the operating efficiency of China’s financial institutions and improving the mix of 
financing vehicles would boost GDP by $62 billion a year,” while allowing more productive 
investment of capital could add another 259 billion US Dollars. The continued lack of variety in 
investment vehicles between now and then means that this money is left on the table. Furthermore, 
letting the market determine interest and exchange rates may, in the short-term, damage China’s 
economy, particularly its slowing export sector, but a stronger Yuan will only help the country 
advance in an increasingly consumer-based economy that requires more diverse investment to 
grow. Liberalization of the interest rates is therefore a balancing act that could either launch 
China's economy into protracted growth, or it has the possibility of derailing China's current 
economic drive. As with many other endeavors, Chinese leaders seem reluctant to deal with this 
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issue as swiftly as many economists would like, but at the very least, there are signs that this 
reform will happen in the near future.  
 
2.1.2: Currency internationalization and exchange rates 
China’s currency is a hot topic among world leaders. According to Holland and Mason (2014), 
American President Barack Obama recently, “urged Chinese President Xi Jinping to move his 
currency toward a more flexible, market-based exchange rate.” Despite external pressures, there 
is internal tension within China regarding the value and possible internationalization of China’s 
currency. The IMF’s Financial System Stability Assessment notes that, “the managed interest rate 
regime and exchange rate system has inhibited financial development and innovation” in China 
(Viñals & Singh, 2011: p. 18). Although China has made some progress in these areas, the IMF’s 
assessment program states that the, “intraday movements of the exchange rate of the Yuan against 
the US Dollar in the inter-bank spot market are limited to ±0.5%” (p. 18). This, along with other 
government regulated financial policies, in effect, stifle innovation and financial exploration by, 
“reducing the demand for hedging products,” though it does lower the risk exposure for both the 
exchange and interest rates (p. 18).  
 
There have, however, been recent developments. The IMF (2011a) states that the international 
use of the Yuan has grown rapidly, primarily due to the, “expansion of the Yuan trade settlement,” 
representing, “around 7% of total trade” in 2011 (p. 13). The Yuan’s expansion into Hong Kong 
has also been noted where the Yuan represents, “8% of the Hong Kong deposit base,” in addition 
to the growth in offshore Yuan financial products with a growing number, “of instruments, spot 
markets, and derivatives now available” (p. 13). Clearly China’s Yuan is expanding into the 
world market, and the numbers suggest solid growth, but the picture is more complicated. The 
same IMF report (2011a) notes that most of the Yuan used, “for trade settlement remains very 
one-sided,” with most of the funds covering imports. Furthermore, the instruments mentioned 
above are still rather limited when compared to the amount of Yuan moving out of the country. 
This focuses the Yuan into, “the Hong Kong clearing bank” (p. 14). The amount of Yuan moving 
out in the world is not necessarily as useful as a financial tool as its volume might suggest and 
does not necessarily allow for the reinvestment of this currency back into the Chinese mainland 
as the funds find homes in other international products.  
 
The IMF consultation report (2011a) states that this, “one-sided growth,” has put a great deal of, 
“pressure on international reserves and revealed the tension between achieving a greater global 
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role for the Yuan at the same time as the currency is undervalued” (p. 14). The Chinese 
government insists that they are tracking the Yuan’s use abroad, largely to confirm that these 
funds are being used in accordance with current regulations and, “only to finance activity in the 
real economy” (p. 14). The Chinese government, despite the call for Yuan internationalization, 
continues to manage the Yuan in order to “ensure stability” rather than risk possible, beneficial 
growth in risky financial adventures (p. 14).  
 
Obviously the exchange rate plays a significant role in China’s development. The IMF 
Consultation report (2011a) notes that the Yuan, “remains substantially below the level,” of the 
optimal exchange rate (p. 18). Though there had been some recent developments in the Yuan 
against the US Dollar, the IMF notes that, “the real effective exchange rate has depreciated over 
the past year.” Finally, the IMF feels that the exchange rate will continue to hamper the 
possibilities for investment and savings (p. 18). At the time, Chinese financial authorities largely 
disagreed with the IMF’s findings. Chinese financial authorities stated that China needed more 
time to, “improve the mechanism for setting the exchange rate,” and that the Yuan was 
continuing, “toward its equilibrium,” and that this trend would continue through the near future (p. 
19). What some may see as sluggish reluctance, the Chinese government merely sees as prudent 
financial strategy.  
 
Chinese leaders continue to keep a tight grip on their currency, both in terms of its exchange rate 
and its internationalization. There is pressure from China’s private sector to move toward these 
goals, but progress has been slow going. Chinese authorities have clearly decided that moving 
glacially is the correct choice, though this method runs the risk of stifling innovation and 
profitable investments that would help support China’s economic growth. Indeed, it is difficult to 
know just how slowly China can move without stumbling over its own economic policies. 
Currency will continue to be at the forefront of a lot of international discussions but China will 
likely only move forward when it feels its export sector is strong enough to withstand the shock 
that appreciation will almost certainly bring. Currently there is no clear commitment which leads 
to the conclusion that in-depth currency reforms might be implemented later rather than sooner.  
  
2.1.3: Shadow banking 
The International Monetary Fund has provided a collective definition of shadow banking activity 
as “all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop 
to operate” (Claessens, & Ratnovski, 2014: 1). In China, shadow banking deals with innovative 
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wealth management products in the non-bank loan financial sector. They are issued by the banks 
as a way to create attractive investment products (Reuters, 2012). By involving systemic 
institutions, shadow banking poses a systemic risk in Chinese economy by making the Chinese 
government the implicit backstop guarantee (Claessens, & Ratnovski, 2014: 5). 
 
Normal practice for Chinese banks does not apply if they are not dealing with deposits, but 
investments. Banks can charge whatever interest rate they want and pay out whatever they want. 
With such high payoffs, bank customers are demanding wealth management products. And 
wealth management products seem like a viable option as they are issued and/or backed by the 
banks or other “credible” actors in the financial sector (Claessens, & Ratnovski, 2014: 5). 
Although the customers are formally notified about important differences, the banks still present 
the wealth management products as deposits and not the investments which they in fact are. This 
is misleading as the customers are not guaranteed the principal, which is the norm. This is not a 
problem as long as the bank can still pay the principal plus interest to the customers as announced 
and advertised. Over the short-term, sometimes a few months, the investment has grown 
substantially. The customers give the banks money, the banks lend the money out, and the 
customers get their principal plus interest back when they are promised it. But the banks use the 
money to pay off other debt, effectively repackaged debt. And since the money is loaned to high-
risk projects, a certain percentage of the money will be lost. So on top of amassing the funds 
necessary to pay back principals plus interest, extra money to cover the lacking inflow from bad 
investments is also necessary. In other words: What started as a snowball is turning into a 
monetary avalanche (Barboza, 2013). The recruiting for customers of shadow banking started in 
entities that cannot get cash otherwise. These are institutions, businesses, even occasionally 
government bodies. The financial gambling inherent in shadow banking is therefore a major 
threat for the Chinese national economy and the federal bank in the role as backstop. Shadow 
banking moves money away from the banks, where there are more government leverage and 
loaner security. If the financial avalanche stops rolling, the financial consequences could be 
devastating. 
 
Because they are investments and not deposits or even consumer loans, the wealth management 
products have been flying under the government regulation radar. It is evident that China needs to 
make bank deposits attractive and stimulate lending diversity in order to shrink shadow banking. 
Such reforms will be beneficial for the average Chinese citizen through more diverse and safer 
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financial products. This will lead to a greater public trust resulting in positive economic 
development. 
 
The international financial society seems to be clear on how these problems are to be solved. As a 
highly credible stakeholder, the International Monetary Fund analyzed the impact of China’s 
liberalization of interest rates. While the smaller banks would increase their deposit rates to 
attract customers, the major banks would lower deposit rates to reduce costs (Feyzioğlu et al, 
2009: 8). This will change the stalemate and create increased competition among the banks to the 
benefit of the customers including average Chinese citizens. In 2011, the International Monetary 
Fund published an assessment of China’s financial stability, based on the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) exercise for China by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. The assessment found that China’s regulatory policies on shadow banking needed to 
be clarified. Also, better coordination, fewer legal restrictions, and more efficient communication 
between the People’s Bank of China and central banks will be necessary to address this issue 
(Viñals, & Singh, 2011: 39). 
 
In general, the assessment found that “reforms have progressed well in moving to a more 
commercially-oriented financial system” (Viñals& Singh, 2011: 7). However, it also pointed that 
China still faced “several near-term risks, structural challenges, and policy-induced distortions”: 
• “The effects of a rapid crisis-related credit expansion on credit quality 
• Growing off-balance sheet exposures and disintermediation 
• A reversal in rapidly rising real estate prices, and an increase in imbalances due to the 
current economic growth pattern” (Ibid.).  
 
The assessment also pointed to a number of areas where reforms would address these challenges, 
generally following the outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan: 
• “Deepening the commercial orientation of banks and other financial firms 
• Moving to more market-based means of influencing monetary and financial conditions 
• Continued strengthening of the capacity of the central bank on financial stability issues, 
and that of the supervisory commissions 
• Further development of financial markets and instruments to deepen and strengthen 
China’s financial system 
• Upgrading the framework for financial stability, crisis management, and resolution 
arrangement” (Ibid.).  
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On March 13th, 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang addressed further reforms at the closing 
meeting of the second annual session of China's 12th National People's Congress. Here is one of 
his statements: "Concerning financial risks such as shadow banking, we are tightening regulation 
and have set a timetable for implementing the regulative measures under the Basel III accord" 
(Lui, 2014b). 
 
Among the purposes of the Basel Committee and the Basel standards is the decrease of capital 
risk (BIS, 2013). The Basel III accord seeks to further strengthen bank capital requirements by 
increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage (BIS, 2014). By seeking to comply with 
the Basel III accord, China sets a course to govern the risk factor within the financial sector. 
When in place, this will decrease the impact of any stress in the financial markets, which would 
include those stresses from shadow banking. Though liberalization of the financial sector is not 
yet evident, China is taking steps to tame the potential shadow banking crisis.  
 
The first fundamental steps have been taken to create a bank sector matching the financial 
demands of the new growth catalysts in today’s China, especially regarding central issues as 
liberalization of the interest rates and constructing a stable foundation for the development. But 
the problems that the reforms seek to avoid are present, which is made obvious by the emergence 
of shadow banking and other hard-to-regulate financial solutions that are attractive alternatives to 
banks. They will presumably grow until the effects are implemented. Still, the huge risks of 
rushing reforms are imminent. Thus, reform of the bank sector is an area in which China cannot 
compromise. Shadow banking is an issue on a short-term scale for China to reach the goal of 
continuous growth for the middle class, but if China follows through on diminishing the shadow 
banking sector, there is a fair chance that this issue can be dealt with in due time.  
 
2.1.4: Local government debt 
Another major issue that economists and China analysts have focused on when discussing and 
predicting the economic future of the country is the amount of debt accumulated by local 
governments in China. Not only have they grown so much to be a national burden, they have also 
become an increasing international concern.  
 
China published a national audit at the end of 2013 to measure the levels of local debts in the 
country. The document revealed that with various debt guarantees added to the total liabilities of 
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local governments in China, their level of debt was equivalent to a third of the national GDP (The 
Economist, 2014b). However, this is not unmanageable and should not be alarming to anyone, as 
long as the situation is dealt with swiftly. The central government must implement mechanisms to 
monitor the situation and prevent local borrowing from matching recent dangerous levels. 
According to a report from the IMF released in January 2014, “China has already started the 
reforms to strengthen fiscal management, especially over local government finances” (IMF, 
2014).  
 
However, one of the biggest issues will be to change the local officials’ mentality. Throughout 
the period of amazing growth based on the fixed asset investment and export-led model, local 
officials with the highest growth rate were rewarded and moved up within the Communist Party. 
This led local officials to support higher spending on their territory, disregarding the significant 
debt they were accumulating. One way the central government could put pressure on local 
governments to spend less is by publicly attributing the debt level by province, instead of giving 
only a countrywide level as it did in its recent audit document. This could prevent provinces like 
Guizhou from accumulating a level of liabilities to as high as 80% of its GDP over four 
consecutive quarters. Nevertheless, this remains manageable because under the Chinese model, 
the central government can assume the responsibility for local government debts. In fact, one of 
the categories of local debts as stated by the audit report is the “debt that the government may 
need to bail out,” implicitly suggesting that the central government will not let the local 
governments default. In his report, “China’s local government debt,” Andy Rothman notes the 
importance of the link to the CCP on this. He writes: “The loans were made by Party-controlled 
banks to Party-controlled local governments, to fund construction of Party-approved public 
infrastructure. (…) There is no independent municipal legal, political or financial structure in 
China, with all local governments effectively an arm of the Party and the central government. 
[And] [e]very year, in its budget report to the National Peoples’ Congress, the Ministry of 
Finance states that it will make up for local-level budget shortfalls” (Rothman, 2014). Given this 
assumption, the local debt level is not a significant issue for the Chinese economy or a major 
obstacle to the country’s economic transition. As can be observed from the graphic below taken 
from Andy’s Rothman’s report, when combining the central government debt and the local 
government debt, the total debt to GDP ratio comes to 53.5% for 2012.  
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Figure 2.2: Government Debt, (Rothman, 2014) 
 
This is not exceptionally high compared to other developed countries around the world. The next 
graphic below compiled using IMF data, puts well behind major global economies, including the 
United States, Germany, and Canada. In addition to this, we must consider that while China’s 
economic growth rate is decreasing, it still remains one of the highest in the world. 
 
Figure 2.3: IMF general government debt/GDP in 2012, (Rothman, 2014) 
 
Throughout its remarkable economic growth, a major strength of the Chinese model has always 
been the authoritarian regime that is leading it. With a central government that is running profits 
and pursuing economic growth, even if more moderate in the upcoming years, it is very difficult 
to believe that it will allow its local governments to default and jeopardize the success of the 
whole nation. 
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However, it is imperative that the Chinese officials act on this now. If the situation continues the 
way that it has for the past six years for only just a few more years, it may become a much more 
serious issue. The government is acutely aware of the importance of this issue and we expect to 
see reforms in the coming years, particularly increased transfers from the Ministry of Finance to 
local governments. A more recent government working report released by Premier Li Keqiang 
outlines a willingness to take on additional government debt, and a 13% increase in the monetary 
supply (Xinhua News Agency, 2014c). Whether this willingness can be transformed into a 
practical and efficient policy will be one of the key things to look for in 2014. At worst, China 
will allow a few local governments to default only to send the message that the practice of 
spending for political promotion is over or that it should not be tolerated when an irresponsible 
amount of debt is accumulated in the process. According to Tsinghua University Professor and 
former advisor to the People’s Bank of China, Li Taokui, this is likely to happen sooner rather 
than later. “The only way to solve the local government debt problem is to allow some defaults to 
take place and to restructure the debt afterwards. This would be something that will surely happen 
in the second half this year” (Chan, Yu, 2014). However, the local debt issue is unlikely to ever 
become a systemic crisis for as long as the current political system remains stable. In this case, 
the Chinese model is actually an advantage for the country because borrowers and lenders are 
both under the ultimate control of the government. The shadow banking system should remain 
closely watched as it could come into play and pose an interesting dilemma to the government on 
this. 
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Section 2.2: Market orientation 
A key element of China's economic transition is the shift to a market oriented approach. A big obstacle 
in this transition is China's dependency on state-ownership: 43% of China's profits in industry and 
business are by State-Owned Enterprises (Cary, 2013).  The OECD has done research on the 
dependency on SOE's in country's economies; China tops this list with a score of 95.9 (on a scale from 
0-100) (Büge et al, 2013). Looking at the graph shows this score in contrast to other (both developed 
and developing) nations.  
Figure 2.4: Country SOE Share for selected 38 countries, (Büge et al, 2013) 
 
This state-ownership does not limit itself to industry but also extends into the banking system; the 
current market is therefore organized into a system in which state-ownership is encouraged, private 
ownership is discouraged, and business is government oriented instead of market oriented. It is clear 
that China is therefore in a unique position and needs drastic changes in order to follow through with 
the economic transition.  
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Where in the past the market played a 'basic role' in China's economy, the leadership has proposed 
reforms that would allow the market to become the decisive factor (Subler, & Yao, 2013). More 
importantly, clear deadlines for deep reforms have yet to be established. China is committed to reform 
and states in its Third Plenum that it wants to "set competitive business free" and eliminate sector 
monopolies (CCP Central Committee, 2013). Its strategy in establishing this is: 1) diversification of 
ownership 2) banking reform; and 3) market pricing of resources.  
Figure 2.5: SOE reforms, (Koch-Weser& Salidjanova, 2013) 
 
2.2.1: Diversification of ownership 
What follows is a key element of the Third Plenum: "We must unwaveringly consolidate and develop 
the public economy, persist in the dominant position of the public ownership, give full rein to the 
guiding function of the State-owned economy, incessantly strengthen the vitality, control power and 
influence of the State-owned economy" (CCP Central Committee, 2013). This shows that even though 
China is committed to macroeconomic reform in the SOE and private sector, this reform will be 
severely constrained since SOEs will remain a pillar of the Chinese economy. Another constraint to 
SOE reform listed above is that the agency that implements these reforms has already outlined several 
limitations that are sector specific. The State-Owned Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) has stated that the sectors vital to national security will remain 100% state-owned. 
Furthermore economic 'lifeblood' industries will remain majority controlled by the state (Silk, 2013). 
While SASAC has not outlined criteria to what SOE belongs in either one of these categories, it shows 
some restraint in liberalizing the Chinese economy.  
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That these constraints could still provide a working model is proven by the success of Singapore's 
commercially oriented Government-Linked Companies. Indeed sources within the Chinese 
government outlined that Singapore's use of a government investment corporation to structure will be 
used as an example for China's reform process (The Economist, 2013).The diversification of 
ownership in China's SOE heavy economy means a two pronged approach: 1) encouragement of 
private shareholders in SOEs; 2) the stimulation of the private sector.  
 
2.2.2: SOE private shareholding 
"Reform towards fully mixed ownership will increase, in such areas as petroleum and petrochemicals, 
power and telecommunications," said Zhang Chunxiao, an adviser at the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) which is responsible for guiding SOE reforms 
(as cited in: Miller, & Zhu, 2014). In order to evaluate SASAC's commitment to this reform, policy 
changes since the Third Plenum have to be analyzed. One of the energy sector policy changes is the 
increase in private shareholding in Sinopec, a super-large petroleum and petrochemical enterprise 
listed on New York, London, Hong Kong, and Shanghai stock exchanges ("About Sinopec", n.d.) 
Sinopec announced it would sell 30% of its marketing arm in a move towards fully mixed ownership 
in accordance with SASAC reforms (Miller, & Zhu, 2014). Even though the markets interpreted this 
as a commitment of China to SOE reform, other analysts are less convinced and expect Sinopec to use 
the revenue of asset sales to buy assets from its parent companies (Lim, 2014). The market is therefore 
highly skeptical of China's ability to evolve into a mixed-ownership economy.  
 
It needs to be taken into account, however, that the Third Plenum’s proposed reforms are still quite 
young and that at this point it is too early to draw conclusions due to a lack of policy changes.   
 
2.2.3: Separation of government and enterprise 
Even though the reform agenda calls for separation of government from enterprise, this point on the 
reform agenda dates back to 1993. This is followed by the formation of SASAC in 2003 which would 
separate direct state control and leave it to a state controlled agency to guide SOE reforms. The 
problem with these reforms is that it does not address corporate governance issues; SOE management 
is directly appointed by SASAC based on political considerations and power is highly centralized 
within these SOEs. The Third Plenum could result in drastic changes, however: not only has it 
announced a more market oriented approach for SOEs, the establishment of a board of directors in 
every SOE is also a clear sign that corporate governance in SOEs is changing (Bin, 2013). 
Furthermore the crackdown on corruption is expected to reach bureau level cadres in 2014 which will 
mean a shift in leadership of the local SOEs (Keohane, 2014). 
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In order to increase the efficiency of SOEs, long-term incentive and control mechanisms will be 
implemented. Strengthening of investment accountability requirements and possible ways to 
disseminate more information to the public are also developed in order to increase market orientation 
(Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 2013).  
 
Market orientation also involves forcing corporate governance to be more risk aware. China is 
notorious for bailing out companies that are on the verge of default; indeed, in China's modern 
economic history, no company has defaulted on its domestic bonds. Allowing defaults is vital in 
letting risk factors contribute to the pricing of resources and services; it will contribute to making 
companies in both the private and public sector more market oriented, which will increase the quality 
of China's growth model. It seems ironic that in order for China to show it is committed to market 
oriented reform, it needs to let parts of its economy fail. This creates a situation in which the default of 
a company means an increase in investors' trust in the economy. The first default of a major Chinese 
company occurred when a major solar-panel manufacturer could not make payments on its domestic 
bonds (Rankin, 2014). That the company is based in Shanghai is interesting since it shows that China 
is testing the default in a zone that can be classified as China's testing ground, to see what impact it has 
on the economy. Analysts are divided on the possible impact of defaults to the Chinese economy; 
while analysts of Barclays claim that the default reduces the risks of moral hazards and will create a 
healthy credit market, Bank of America analysts said default could be "China's Bear Stearns moment"2 
(as cited in: Gittleson, 2014). Since default is now an actual risk for investors, bonds will become 
more expensive, which can cause severe problems for companies in China (Desai, & Wilday, 2014). 
Allowing defaults, even though vital in China's process to become more market oriented, therefore has 
the potential of derailing China's economy. This means that 2014 will be the pivotal year in which 
China will successfully step in either the direction of a competition based economy, or a financial 
crisis. 
 
2.2.4: Private sector 
China's commitment to a more market oriented approach and the opening up of sectors that are 
dominated by monopolies means easier access for private enterprises into areas that were previously 
off limits to them. The touchstone of China's economy needs to be studied in order to see how China is 
structuring the opening up of monopoly industries. Shanghai is now regularly used as a pilot scheme 
in which reforms are tested before being introduced to a wider range of cities. The government 
announced that it will open up seven telecommunication service providers to foreign capital in the 
recently established Free Trade Zone (Xinhua News Agency, 2014). Furthermore, they announced at 
the beginning of 2014 that it will enable Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (WFOE) establishment in 
                                                          
2 With "Bear Stearns moment" these analysts mean that it could trigger a market panic due to the default of a 
major enterprise 
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the Shanghai FTZ (China Briefing, 2014). The success of the Shanghai FTZ will influence China's 
commitment to reforms and determine the depth and width of these reforms. Even though this means 
that China still takes a very gradual approach to economic reform, the setting of a 2020 deadline 
means that more structural reforms will have to be implemented. A positive note in the reform debate 
is that the private sector has been steadily growing in the previous decade while SOE size has 
remained a constant. Furthermore, the contribution to GDP growth from the private sector outweighs 
the SOE contribution to the total GDP which means that the private sector is becoming more and more 
important for the quality of China's growth (Ying, 2013). The new diversification of ownership 
commitment in the Third Plenum will speed up the existing trend of private sector growth which will 
increase the quality of China's growth.  
 
2.2.5: SOEs and banking 
The emergence of shadow banking, outlined earlier in the financial chapter, demonstrates the necessity 
of reforms in the Chinese banking system if further economic development is to be supported and 
facilitated by the financial sector. If the right financial products are not available, the financial market 
is locked out of development, and the banks do not support the private sector, where development 
supposedly happens. Reforming the banking sector is therefore a key element in the diversification of 
ownership in China's economy. Currently the Chinese banking system gives preferential treatment to 
the SOEs, providing them with easy credit (Cary, 2013). As outlined earlier, these SOEs are a lot more 
inefficient than private companies. It has led to a disproportionate amount of non-performing loans. 
Indeed this 'easy credit' has been systematically granted to SOEs with a high default risk (Huet al, 
2005). 
 
Non-performing loans from the major banks are still a big problem, especially with regards to the lack 
liquidity options for a broader group of medium- and small-sized enterprises and private people. China 
needs to act in order to prevent a money flow out of the balance sheets of banks and into other sources 
of financial growth, as the emergence of shadow banking illustrates. China needs to take control of 
banking development by offering liquidity to a wider segment of society, rather than see non-bank 
financial sector establish a market of innovative business models that assume the role of banks. That 
might lead to the desired opportunities for growth of the middle class, but it is more difficult to 
regulate and contains risks for the situation to spin out of control (Barboza, 2014).  
 
A McKinsey projection suggests “that the structure of China’s banking market will continue to change 
at an unprecedented rate as business opportunities shift from large state-owned enterprises to small 
and midsize businesses and the newly enlarged ranks of middle-class consumers" (Liao et al, 2013). 
The 2011 International Monetary Fund assessment of China’s financial stability holds 
recommendations towards a more market-based system that can facilitate this development. It points 
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out a number of areas of policy reforms that will be needed to promote financial stability while 
supporting continued balanced growth (Viñals& Singh, 2011: 8p): 
• Improved management of systemic liquidity 
• Greater use of market-oriented monetary policy instruments, e.g. interest rates 
• Broadening financial markets and services 
• A reorientation in the role and responsibilities of government 
• Replacing the use of the commercial banking system to pursue broader policy goals 
• An upgrading of the financial infrastructure and legal framework. 
 
The assessment stresses that these reforms are to be implemented at a pace that does not jeopardize 
stability. The foundation should be created through “functioning legal, regulatory, supervisory, and 
crisis management framework” before streamlining the banking sector for market introduction 
(Viñals& Singh, 2011: 9). 
 
The World Bank also sees a strong effect and a long-term sustainability of China’s economic growth if 
the obvious reforms are implemented in China (The World Bank, 2014). The World Bank stresses that 
it would enhance incentives for private investment, especially in currently monopolized or 
concentrated sectors by (Ibid.): 
• Removing entry barriers 
• Simplifying approval procedures 
• Reducing regulatory and administrative burdens 
• Consolidating the business tax with the value-added tax will lower the tax burden and promote 
investment in transportation and financial services. 
 
The World Bank has promoted a policy that would make more land available for commercial activities, 
thereby improving service sector growth. Still, The World Bank expects and acknowledges the reform 
process as to be “gradual, with more specific follow-up implementation plans expected as the year 
goes on" (Ibid.). Reform in the banking sector is intertwined with both SOE reform and the 
liberalization of interest rates, exchange rates, and shadow banking. Whatever happens in these fields 
will determine how successful China is in implementing reforms in the SOE banking sector.  
 
2.2.6: Market pricing 
Price regulation reform allowing for the market determination of prices is one of the reforms that will 
affect the way SOEs can do business. It will enable SOEs to become internationally more competitive 
since it is no longer constrained by domestic policy. Sinopec, for example, had some difficulty since 
the Chinese government outlined domestic energy prices instead of taking into account market 
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fluctuations (CNN Money, 2011). Deregulating the prices for energy and resources is a key aspect in 
providing incentives for SOE management to force SOEs to adjust for domestic and international 
competition. Price reform will also allow fair competition for private enterprises in a previous state 
monopolized sector. China's National Energy Administration has announced that it would allow 
private access to its pipeline system in order to let the market determine the allocation of resources 
(Ling, 2014).  This proposed deregulation of prices will make it possible for private and foreign 
enterprises to be more competitive in the energy sector while also making SOEs more market oriented.  
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Chapter 3: Socioeconomic Developments 
This report’s goal is to determine the future direction of China’s economy. As such, much of this 
report focuses on the economy itself as seen in chapter two regarding China’s economic difficulties. 
There are, however, other sectors of Chinese society that impact its economy. The Chinese 
government has made pulling the population out of poverty one of their top goals. China’s rapid 
growth from a developing country to the second largest economy in the world in just a matter of 
decades has been called a miracle. But GDP graphs and growth projections cannot tell the whole story. 
China’s population can be seen as an important, if not one of its greatest resources. With that in mind, 
it is important to step back from the direct analysis of China’s economy and analyze what role China’s 
citizens have played in China’s economic growth. Looking forward, China will attempt to transition 
from an export-led growth model to a consumption-based growth model. This requires new policies 
that will strengthen China’s growing middle class. These efforts are supported by a long running push 
toward urbanization which is regulated through China’s hukou system, or household registration 
system. This chapter deals with some of the socioeconomic issues tied to people and places as well as 
their impact on the future of China’s economy. 
 
Section 3.1: Domestic consumption 
Ensuring that citizens benefit from China’s transformation is the core strategy of China’s overall 
economic development. Simply put, this is where China must succeed. First and foremost, perceptible 
progress continuously legitimizes the CCP’s leadership within China. Secondly, increased wealth 
among the Chinese will itself act as a key catalyst for future growth.  
 
Strengthening domestic consumption in China can be promoted through several different factors. For 
instance, trust in social stability and security will allow citizens to pull some of their capital out of 
savings accounts and aid economic development through other investments. This exact issue is 
covered in Social policies reform section of this chapter. This is the case with many other factors 
contributing to the total framework of strengthening domestic consumption.  
 
3.1.1: Enriching households 
The level of socioeconomic development throughout China varies widely; it is extremely complex, if 
not impossible, to give a nationally accurate definition for the middle class in China. This can be seen 
in China’s definition of range of middle class income according to the National Bureau of Statistics 
(Wang, 2010). Household annual incomes range from 7,250 US Dollars to 62,500 US Dollars, a 
testament to the difficulty in determining who is and who is not included in the middle class. It 
perhaps makes more sense to look at how a general increase of the middle class is being facilitated. 
The term “increase” applies to both quantity and annual income for households relative to current 
figures. It then becomes a question of a widespread boost of domestic consumption. 
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Domestic consumption is, in this case, defined as private consumption, which refers to the spending 
power of private households in China. If the household income share of China’s GDP can be increased, 
this will lead to higher consumption. Such a development will support the transition of China’s 
economy. It will promote an economy where domestic financial circulation will dampen the 
dependence on primary and secondary sectors of the economy to create growth. Even tertiary sectors 
of the economy will be boosted to accommodate rising consumption. This development will create 
jobs and also generate taxes. 
 
With that in mind, the objective of this section is to investigate how skillfully China is at increasing 
the volume of private households that have sufficient spending power to contribute to the 
strengthening of domestic consumption. This socioeconomic group is universally defined as the 
middle class. Furthermore, this section will also investigate how China manages to increase spending 
power within the middle class. Finally, it will analyze how China creates more jobs for the ever 
increasing number of China’s educated middle class. 
 
3.1.2: Chinese consumption – not as bad as it looks 
In the midst of China’s economic growth, household consumption has not been able to keep up a 
proportional share of GNP. In 2005, household consumption fell below 40% of GNP. Numbers 
showed that this tendency could not only be explained by an increase in savings (Aziz & Cui, 2007: 3). 
 
However, this is not necessarily an unsettling development. As Figure 3.1 shows, China’s 
consumption is alive and well. It is merely the tremendous overall economic growth that dwarfs an 
impressing consumption growth. Still, measures can be taken to increase consumption’s contribution 
to GDP. Thus, China has a strong incentive to facilitate higher spending by middle class households 
relatively to the future total economic growth. 
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Figure 3.1: The bars show the increase of consumption in China and other major countries in USD. 
The dots show the real growth in consumption, (Barnett, 2013) 
 
Household consumption contributes a low share of China’s GDP especially when compared to 
countries with a similar GDP per capita, as Figure 3.2 shows. Even though soaring saving rates are 
blamed, this is not a sufficiently comprehensive answer. 
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Figure 3.2: China’s private consumption compared to GDP per capita, relative to other countries, 
(Barnett et al, 2012) 
 
3.1.3: Translating wages into purchases 
In spite of rapid growth and economic development, poverty and income equality are still key issues in 
relation to the growth of the middle class (The World Bank, 2014f). The middle class’s contribution to 
domestic consumption is impeded by an overall decrease in labor income. While wages themselves 
have grown faster than productivity, the employment rate has struggled to increase at a pace expected 
for sizeable GDP growth as in the case of China (Guo & N’Diaye, 2010: 7). 
 
At the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Congress in 2013, President Xi Jinping 
outlined economic reforms that would allow market forces to play a pivotal role in the allocation of 
resources (Hui, 2013). This would result in drastic changes in the Chinese labor market. As wages 
increase, capital is to be invested in machines rather than manual labor to create the effective 
production that market forces stimulate. This will lead to much needed efficiency improvements in the 
primary and secondary sectors, with agriculture representing an important sector (Guo & N’Diaye, 
2009: 10). The following lower employment intensity of future growth is a major challenge that needs 
to be overcome in order to boost the number of Chinese middle class citizens with money to spend. 
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Following this development, it is crucial to create new types of jobs for the large numbers of Chinese 
people that do not have a higher education. For this population group, the increase of employment 
must come from less conventional jobs in the future. Though a driver for GDP growth, the export-led 
secondary sector of the economy, manufacturing, has failed to create the employment opportunities 
necessary to facilitate a quantity increase in household income with middle class status (Guo & 
N’Diaye, 2010: 7p). 
 
There is a need for political measures that will encourage employment growth in the tertiary sector, 
services, and the non-tradable sector overall3. China has been struggling to create a growth in the 
tertiary sector relative to the primary and secondary sectors. Great potential lies within the strategy of 
transferring low-educated labor force from the primary and secondary sectors to the more labor-
intensive tertiary sector. 
 
3.1.4: No jobs for brains 
In order for this to happen, people first have to spend. Thus, it is a development that might have to be 
pushed from elsewhere. For this, look no further than the growing population group with a higher 
education; a high level of education ought to lead to a high income level to use for consumption. 
 
China faces major obstacles for enabling the reliance on present and future higher education graduates 
to facilitate a consumption boost. Unlike with health care reform, education reform is not a problem 
the government can solve by just throwing money at the situation (Barnett & Brooks, 2010: 11). Well-
funded schools and universities are important, but it is more a matter of developing a robust job 
market for the highly educated. In 2011, China had more than 30 million students enrolled in higher 
education, an increase of 35% compared to 2005. In 2010, the gross enrollment rate in China’s higher 
education reached 27%, an increase of nearly 6% compared to 2005 (People’s Daily Online Reports, 
2011). 
 
                                                          
3The non-tradable sector is defined as the sum of the tertiary sector and construction in the secondary sector 
(Guo & N’Diaye, 2009: 4). 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
 
P a g e  | 32 
 
Figure 3.3: Number of graduates of higher education in China each year 1975-2011. The need for 
specialist job creation is ascending to match the number of both existing and newly graduated 
academics, (Lin, 2012) 
 
This is a three-headed challenge. First, many young, talented workers with the capability to promote 
growth through R&D ply their skills abroad, supporting brain drain in China. Second, many highly 
educated graduates still choose the safe choice of SOEs 4. Following the one-child policy, many 
graduates are laden with large family responsibilities. Ensuring that they can provide for themselves as 
well as their parents later in life, they strive for job security over other considerations. SOEs provide a 
safer choice than the private sector (Davis, 2013). Thirdly, with entrepreneurial and innovative minds 
immigrating or choosing to join SOEs, the development and growth within the private sector becomes 
marginalized. 
 
                                                          
4 See Figure 3.4 
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Figure 3.4: Employment in China. As the development shows, the primary sector holds a decreasing 
number as well as the total share of employed persons. State-Owned Units/Enterprises still create a 
large share of new employment, although private enterprises and units with funding from abroad, 
including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, are seeing a steeper development of employment, (CSY, 
2013) 
 
Beyond these challenges, there are simply not enough jobs available for the many highly skilled 
graduates. In 2003, 2.12 million Chinese academics graduated from domestic universities. In 2013, 
Item 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
  Economically Active Population         (10 000 persons) 77046 77510 78388 78579 78894
  Total Number of Employed Persons   (10 000 persons) 75564 75828 76105 76420 76704
      Primary Industry 29923 28890 27931 26594 25773
      Secondary Industry 20553 21080 21842 22544 23241
      Tertiary Industry 25087 25857 26332 27282 27690
  Composition of Employed Persons             (total=100)
      Primary Industry 39.6 38.1 36.7 34.8 33.6
      Secondary Industry 27.2 27.8 28.7 29.5 30.3
      Tertiary Industry 33.2 34.1 34.6 35.7 36.1
  Number of Employed Persons by Urban and
    Rural Areas                                       (10 000 persons)
  Urban Employed Persons 32103 33322 34687 35914 37102
      State-owned Units 6447 6420 6516 6704 6839
      Urban Collective-owned Units 662 618 597 603 589
      Cooperative Units 164 160 156 149 149
      Joint Ownership Units 43 37 36 37 39
      Limited Liability Corporations 2194 2433 2613 3269 3787
      Share-holding Corporations Ltd. 840 956 1024 1183 1243
      Private Enterprises 5124 5544 6071 6912 7557
      Units with Funds from Hong Kong, Macao & Taiwan 679 721 770 932 969
      Foreign Funded Units 943 978 1053 1217 1246
      Self-employed Individuals 3609 4245 4467 5227 5643
  Rural Employed Persons 43461 42506 41418 40506 39602
      Private Enterprises 2780 3063 3347 3442 3739
      Self-employed Individuals 2167 2341 2540 2718 2986
  Number of Registered Unemployed Persons 886 921 908 922 917
    in Urban Areas                                    (10 000 persons)
  Registered Unemployment Rate in Urban Areas    (%) 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.1
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this number reached 6.99 million. According to a survey by MyCOS, a data firm in Beijing, in April 
2013 shortly before graduation, 35% of these soon-to-be college graduates had found jobs. Among 
postgraduates, 26% had signed an employment contract (Gu, 2013). The postgraduate unemployment 
issue demonstrates the need for more opportunities in R&D or other specialized areas.  
 
As the highly educated cannot find jobs matching their qualifications, they end up taking up lower 
skilled jobs that are also low-paid (Lin, 2012). Firstly, this development means that graduates are 
unable to earn as much and thus consume at the rate lower than their qualifications would indicate. 
They fail to deliver the consumption boost that should create jobs for people with no or lower 
education in the tertiary sector. Secondly, it means that the graduates occupy jobs for the less educated, 
who are supposed to boost the quantity of the middleclass and private household consumption, a trend 
that should have been appeared as the highly educated in high paying jobs consumed more, requiring 
more tertiary sector job growth.5 
 
The challenges in producing employment opportunities are evident. The educational level is rising. 
The market forces will increasingly streamline and mechanize primary and secondary sectors to make 
them more cost-efficient and less labor-intensive. If the middle class is to grow and boost consumption, 
job creation is key. The focus must be on facilitating jobs for the highly educated as this will have a 
trickle-down effect for the rest of society. 
 
3.1.5: A new understanding of xiaokang society 
To truly boost middle class consumption, it is also important to look into developing the existing 
middle class. One method is to increase the quantitative size of the middle class as described. There is 
also a need to lift the economic latitude of the people in the middle class, vis-à-vis a qualitative 
improvement. The following section will analyze the emerging, lower middle class in universal terms. 
 
In China, this social group is defined as “xiaokang”, meaning “well-off and moderate prosperity”. The 
term is deeply rooted in Chinese and Confucian culture as the understanding of working hard to 
acquire what is needed for the family to succeed (Xu, 2009: 1). The reforms, which started under Deng 
Xiaoping in 1979, borrowed the xiaokang term to describe China’s ambition to end shortages of food 
and clothing, quadrupling the GDP of 1980 by 2000, and raising the Chinese living standard to a well-
off level. 
 
                                                          
5It is a small comfort that the graduates provide a labor force that excides the required qualifications for these 
jobs. Often, the graduates’ prevailing theoretical qualifications are even leading to employers turning them down 
(Lin, 2012). 
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In 2000, the goals for the following 20 years were also defined as creating a xiaokang society. This 
time, the goal was “building a moderately prosperous society, or xiaokang society, in all aspects for 
the entire Chinese population that features accelerated economic development, enhanced democracy, 
advanced science and education, prosperous culture, harmonious society, higher living standard, more 
efficient use of resources and friendly environment,” according to Dr. Xu Xianchun, Deputy 
Commissioner of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Ibid.). 
 
In the area of economic development in China, Dr. Xu Xianchun mentions five indicators to review 
the development towards the new xiaokang ideal (Xu, 2012: 1): 
• GDP per capita 
• Share of R&D expenses in GDP 
• Share of value-added of the tertiary industry in GDP 
• Proportion of urban population 
• Urban unemployment rate. 
 
Dr. Xu Xianchun stresses the need for the GDP per capita to be quadrupled between 2000 and 2020 in 
order to facilitate a development towards the desired xiaokang society (Ibid.). According to data from 
the World Bank, this development is still on track with a GDP per capita in constant Yuan of 7,858 in 
2000 and 23,441 in 2012. Still, China’s status as the second largest national economy in the world is 
not reflected in the GDP per capita. In 2012, China was ranked 83rd according to the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2014g). As for income distribution, the Gini coefficient publicized by China for 2013 
showed that it is close to stagnation, and the wealth gap even increased according to most recent data 
from the World Bank in 2009 (Qi, 2014). The lopsided income distribution is an official concern for 
China, and the wealth gap might be even higher than the Gini coefficient released by China displays 
(Wang & Yao, 2013), which Dr. Xu Xianchun also indirectly mentions (Xu, 2012: 3). In a famously 
referenced quote, Deng Xiaopeng stated that some should be allowed to get rich first during economic 
development (Gittings, 2002). Now it seems that in order to raise living standards in overall society, 
China should not only turn to economic growth but also promote a higher level of egalitarian wealth 
distribution to achieve the xiaokang strategy. 
 
The spending on R&D, measured as share of GDP, is, though promoted as pivotal, rather vaguely 
explained by Dr. Xu Xianchun (Xu, 2012: 2). He points out that it is hard to define the effect of R&D 
expenditure. This merely seems to cover up that it is also hard to make R&D expenditure result in 
growth and job creation in this phase of China’s economic development. According to data from the 
World Bank, China is increasing its R&D expenditure as share of GDP (World Bank, 2014c). When 
adjusted for the high-percentage GDP growth in China in recent years, it makes the increase even 
higher than the strict percentage increase would indicate. Still, as demonstrated earlier in this section, 
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China is not able to offer a job market for the highly educated section of the labor force, which has a 
sizeable socioeconomic payoff. Instead, the socioeconomically advantaged graduates are a major 
liability to social stability, while causing imbalance in the remaining labor market (Bradsher & Wong, 
2013). Putting R&D expenditure into more efficient job creation projects ought to be a focal point in 
the present xiaokang strategy. 
 
The influence of a higher share of GDP growth stemming from the tertiary sector is consistent with 
findings described previously in this section. As the development towards a market economy occurs, 
automation of primary and secondary sectors will increase cost efficiency and decrease labor intensity. 
Thus, jobs need to be created in the tertiary sector, especially to accommodate citizens with lower 
education, professionally trained, or no education at all, the latter largely composed of migrant 
workers (Roberts, 2014). 
 
The challenges related to the proportion of urban population, such as inflated real estate prices, 
urbanization, and social security safety net, are thoroughly dealt with in other sections of this report. 
To summarize the findings of these sections, there are many obstacles to be removed in order to cope 
with the continuous urbanization of the Chinese population, which a partisan Dr. Xu Xianchun deems 
as a progressive development (Xu, 2012: 2). The increasing share of the population living in urban 
areas also highlights the challenge of job creation, where less labor-intensive primary and secondary 
sectors are to be counterweighed by tertiary sector jobs. This combination of tertiary sector jobs in 
urban areas in itself will both create a base for continuous higher wages, but also a long-term systemic 
risk if the rest of the macroeconomic development does not succeed to match tertiary sector 
development (Baumol, 1967: 421). 
 
The urban unemployment rate in China was in 2012 estimated to 4.1% 6. However, the official 
unemployment rates from China are widely considered to be fabricated as artificially low (Rogers, 
2013). With the present, relative to both other countries and China’s GDP, low level of social safety 
net in China, it is pivotal to have a job to obtain a xiaokang lifestyle. The unemployed share of the 
population of course has a hard time to take part of the rise or to enter this social group. Instead, they 
become an economic liability for the state living on social security and possible demands for 
social/political reforms (Gotchar, 2008: 22). Combining the relatively low financial rate of this social 
security, desperate measures might seem as a tempting way out of penury. Joining organized crime, 
e.g. begging (Gotchar, 2008: 31, 42), is only one example of the crime increase that stems from 
unemployment, social inequality, and lack of education (Cheong &Wu, 2013: 31). 
 
                                                          
6See Figure 3.4 
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To summarize the current situation for these five economic development indicators towards the 
desired xiaokang society, much improvement needs to be made in order to succeed and create this 
“well-off and moderate prosperity” society. This definition, however, seems to help the CCP to set a 
discourse to measure the success of its ability to create prosperity for the Chinese people: It is not 
about getting wealthy and living in abundance, but rather having enough to avoid a struggle to cover 
basic needs. This serves as a valuable tool to tame any debate about social inequality and 
redistribution of wealth and risk of social instability. Still, parts of the population are and will continue 
to struggle for the foreseeable future. Observing that others do not struggle, it might lead to social 
disturbances. 
 
A “well-off and moderate prosperity” approach for the household incomes seems ineffective in 
creating a middle class with the economic latitude to boost domestic consumption. Instead, the 
government should focus on higher income equality through redistribution of wealth and create a labor 
market accommodating the qualifications of various social groups as they are to find their labor force 
eligibility in a Chinese economy and society in transition. 
 
3.1.6: The price of a prosperous middle class 
The key concern is, of course, whether or not this increased household income in a growing middle 
class will have an effect. In 2009, this matter was thoroughly dealt with by McKinsey& Company, a 
global management consulting firm for businesses, governments, and institutions (McKinsey, 2014). 
McKinsey& Company found that a consumer-centric economy would allocate resources much more 
broadly in the Chinese society and boost further economic growth (Devan et al, 2009). To facilitate 
this, China needs to improve its international relatively low consumption-to-GDP ratio. This can be 
facilitated by reforms in three key areas (Devan, Dobbs et al, 2009: 8): 
• Enable consumer spending 
• Improve the social safety net 
• Rebalance investment and income.  
 
Although the areas of social safety nets and investment and income are somewhat processed in this 
section, other sections in this report handle these areas more comprehensively. The focus in this 
section is consumption, and McKinsey& Company define two major policy focal points that may 
trigger higher consumer spending (Devan, Dobbs et al, 2009: 12): 
• Expanding the availability and improving the quality of products 
• Increasing the availability and uptake of consumer credit.  
 
While the latter is analyzed in the interest rate liberalization section of this report, the relevance of 
supply and quality of domestic products is a very relevant factor in China. For instance, several food-
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related scandals have hit the media, with tainted milk powder being the most prominent and persistent 
including severe influence on the global market (The New York Times, 2014). Also the Chinese auto 
industry has been taking blows for disregarding safety issues (Shirouzu, 2012). McKinsey & Company 
points out the value of a rising tertiary sector to boost a consumption growth and employment, as 
earlier concluded in this section (Devan, Dobbs et al, 2009: 13). McKinsey& Company finds that 
shaping a middle class spending increases will fuel future growth in China. 
 
3.1.7: A government shift towards promoting consumption 
Recently, Chinese leaders have put their words of concern into action in this area of economic 
development. After the second annual session of China's 12th National People's Congress in March 
2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang gave a progress report on the government’s policy concerning 
boosting household income and the middle class. Here, he announced it was the government’s goal to 
create 10 million more jobs this year (Yi, 2014). Premier Li Keqiang mentioned three major tasks in 
social policy (Hui, 2014b), all very much in line with the xiaokang society idea: 
• Meet people's basic living needs 
• Provide the last resort for people to fall back on in case of special difficulty 
• Promote social fairness. 
 
Fluffy as this might be, the statements show an acknowledgement of the problems at hand. The 
progress report stated that the key to stable growth was to shift the growth away from the export- and 
investment-led model and let domestic demand be the "main engine" that drives growth and 
investment (Hui, 2014a). The need for reforms seems to be evident to the government. Various steps 
have been taken to regain consumer trust in domestic products, among them a focus on food and drugs 
(Chen, 2014) 
 
However, there are signs that the government has not yet understood the problems of facilitating 
middle class job creation and thus fighting unemployment. Li Keqiang mentioned his ambition of 
increasing the number of rural students from poor areas that enroll in top-tier higher education 
institutions by 10% (Hui, 2014b). With the existing problems of employing higher education graduates 
in mind, this policy is not launched with due care and a sense of the actual needs for the middle class. 
More targeted policies are therefore needed, especially with the diversity of China’s middle class in 
mind (Barton et al, 2013). 
 
3.1.8: Looking forward on issues of domestic consumption 
In short, China needs to promote both quantitative and qualitative growth of the middle class in order 
to boost domestic consumption; however, despite tremendous economic growth, this area has been 
somewhat neglected. The best way to achieve higher consumption is to secure employment in the 
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tertiary sector, as this will facilitate domestic consumption and take over job creation from the market-
reformed primary and secondary sectors. This will support the development of the tertiary sector, as 
higher rates of consumption must be initiated by a socioeconomically advantaged upper middle class, 
which should consist of the ever-increasing number of highly educated Chinese citizens. 
Unfortunately, the Chinese government has so far struggled to create the sufficient amount of high-
skill jobs. This has stifled the trickle-down effect in the general labor market and is a liability to social 
stability. 
 
The xiaokang society has a rather long tradition in Chinese culture. Though plans have been put forth 
that would promote the promotion of the “well-off and moderate prosperity” ideals, the current 20-
year plan for this strategy faces major challenges. These plans are unambitious in terms of making 
domestic consumption large enough to be a driver for future economic growth. Instead, the Chinese 
should do everything to promote domestic consumption through policy-making and increasing 
consumer trust in consumption. The Chinese government has clearly understood the magnitude of this 
policy area. But it is still doubtful whether the right strategy will be implemented in time. 
 
Section 3.2: Space and migration 
China’s economic success may well rest on its middle class and how successful the Chinese 
government’s policies are in supporting and strengthening this burgeoning section of their society. 
There are a number of related issues that need to be explored in order to understand how the Chinese 
government is addressing this area of growth. Some of these issues include the real estate market, with 
the ever looming possibility of property bubble, as well as China’s push toward urbanization, which 
will likely require a reform of the hukou household registration system. These issues are discussed in 
detail below. 
 
3.2.1: Real estate 
There has been much speculation regarding the possibility of a Chinese property bubble. Krugman 
(2011) compared China’s property bubble, largely fuelled by rapid credit growth in shadow banks, to 
the Japan bubble of the 1980s and the US bubble of 2007. The IMF’s consultation report (2011a) lists 
the property bubble as one of the, “near-term domestic risks” to China’s financial sector alongside, “a 
decline in credit quality linked to the post-crisis expansion in lending” (p. 1). This same report states 
that, “a property bubble would pose serious macroeconomic and financial stability risks” (p. 9). 
Though there is not necessarily a consensus on the weakness of the real estate market, Xinhua News 
Agency (2014a) notes that the, “China Bank Regulatory Commission will keep a close eye on major 
housing developers, and reduce the risk of default through weak links in the construction industry's 
money chain.” Clearly problems with the real estate market in China have much to do with shadow 
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banking, discussed in chapter two of this report, but China’s property market still deserves closer 
inspection. 
 
The IMF (2011a) states that the government has recently done quite a bit to decrease the growing 
property prices, with much of the curbing coming from the, “restrictions on purchases of properties for 
investment purchases” (p. 9). This same report has also found that Chinese citizens have been moving 
from purchasing to renting property, and while commercial property prices have continued to 
skyrocket particularly in China’s coastal regions, the Chinese government has continued to tacitly 
adjust the housing prices by building housing for people with lower incomes (p. 9). This is seen 
simultaneously as a social good for China’s citizens, a means to reduce housing demands that 
increases property costs, and likely serves as an important driver for China’s GDP growth through 
construction.  
 
Setting aside the issue of construction and demand, the IMF (2011a) has remained concerned about the 
cost of housing to total household income, a situation that may lead to loan defaults and the dreaded 
property bubble (p. 9). This may be disastrous as the, “property sector occupies a central position in 
the Chinese economy, directly making up 12% of GDP and is highly connected to upstream industries 
(like steel and cement) and downstream producers of appliances and other consumer durables,” while 
also representing just under 20% of the credit portfolio for Chinese banks (p. 9). Property is clearly big 
business in China. 
 
Despite the rather grim news, the IMF did not forecast an immediate implosion of the Chinese housing 
market in their 2011 consultation report. Though the amount of funding flowing into property, largely 
from a lack of alternative investment opportunities, and the property developers overinvesting in land, 
government authorities have begun to address the risks, emphasizing the need for fair housing prices 
as a means to redress, “inequality and social stability” (IMF, 2011a: 9). Furthermore, Chinese 
authorities will continue to build homes for lower income families for the foreseeable future, aiding 
the growth of property while keeping prices low thanks to government-controlled growth of the supply 
of homes.  
 
Another important area of change is tied into social trends. Chinese citizens switching from 
homeownership to renting may impact social stability as citizens find the Chinese Dream harder and 
harder to attain, but it will at least reduce the possible number of failed loans that might impact 
China’s banking system.  
 
Again, it is important to stress the interconnectedness with shadow banking and the real estate market. 
Provided more people can get access to safe, fair loans, and are not reliant on unregulated and unsafe 
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shadow banking systems, the property sector will hopefully remain stable for the foreseeable future. A 
liberalized economy that allows for additional sources of investment outside of property and other 
immature investment instruments will hopefully prevent the much bemoaned property bubble. The 
real estate bubble is therefore heavily dependent on the success of other reforms outlined in the 
previous chapter. It substantiates the argument that a failure to implement in-depth reforms could 
derail both China's financial and social sectors.  
 
3.2.2: Urbanization 
Urbanization is a fact of life in China. It has been happening for decades and will continue to into the 
foreseeable future. The issue at hand is whether or not urbanization helps or hampers China’s 
economic development. Though some reports show that urbanization is not a direct driver of an 
economy, urban areas are important to any modern economy because they allow for the efficient 
dissemination of public goods and services while also being the base for most economic development. 
Chinese leaders recognize the importance of urban areas, and have been promoting them through 
national government policies, but there have been setbacks. Poorly implemented urbanization plans, 
often coupled with corruption among business and political leaders, has led to a rather haphazard 
effectiveness of urban areas and has only highlighted issues of income disparity as well as regional 
favoritism. Moving forward, China needs to ensure that their cities become efficient, ideal places to 
live rather than simply throwing money at city leaders and hoping they can keep the economy afloat.  
 
Definitions: urban, urbanization, the hukou system 
The first step in understanding China’s urbanization process is to understand exactly what is meant by 
the terms “urban” and “urbanization.” To put it simply, “urban” in an area related to a city, while 
“urbanization” often implies the spread of a city and its components (i.e. buildings, services, and 
population) into lower density rural environments. There are a number of factors in China that make 
determining what is “urban” and what is “rural” rather difficult to separate. Accounting for the process 
of urbanization, representing the outward urban spread pushing into rural areas, also complicates the 
definition. 
 
The story of China’s modern urbanization trend begins in the post-Mao era. Chan (1994), analyzing 
urban data from the early 1980s, notes that at that time there were, “two types of officially designated 
urban places,” namely, “cities (shi) and towns (zhen),” (p. 248). The difference between cities, towns, 
and other rural areas is important since, according to Chan (1994), these designations exist within a 
government hierarchy whereby urban areas receive greater, “access to larger state financial resources 
for urban infrastructure, food subsidies for its resident, industrial investment, and [allows] the local 
government a greater autonomy to raise certain taxes” (p. 248). Larger urban areas have greater access 
to funds than smaller towns and rural settlements. 
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The city/town system is further complicated by additional subcategories beneath the city and town 
headings. According to Chan (1994), there are a number of provincial-level cities (e.g. Beijing, 
Shanghai) that are directly controlled by the Chinese central government, prefectural-level cities that 
are controlled by provincial government, and county-level cities that are likewise administered by sub-
provincial authorities (p. 248). These extreme subdivisions complicate matters since, as Chan (1994) 
notes, cities at the provincial and prefectural levels may cover such a wide area-- usually divided into 
districts and suburbs-- that they actually include areas “predominantly agricultural in nature” (p. 251). 
In short, referring to a “city” as designated by the Chinese government may not present an accurate 
picture of a strictly urban environment. 
 
Government officials and scholars alike seem equally frustrated by these difficult, contradictory 
divisions. Chan (1994) states that separating the rural from the urban became, “harder in the post-Mao 
era as the previous policy of rigidly segmenting the rural and urban sectors gave way to more flexible 
policy” (p. 257). Since then, though, the Chinese government has continued to refine its census 
statistic data and has introduced a number of additional “settlement subdivisions” (Chan, 1994: 257). 
Not wanting to go into too much detail, it is important to remember that the term “urban” in China, 
particularly as it applies to large areas with sizeable populations, must be viewed skeptically. 
 
Though perhaps less statistically problematic than the term “urban,” the word “urbanization” can also 
be rather difficult to pin down. Chen (2006) defines urbanization as the dual processes of “urban 
population growth,” and, “the expansion of urban areas themselves” (p. 101). It is important to note 
that these two activities are neither identical nor mutually exclusive. Urban population growth 
normally means the migration of rural residents to urban areas. The expansion of an urban area might 
also include elevating a town to a city using the government nomenclature, or expanding the city 
limits that divide an urban area from a rural area. In this second definition, the spatial expansion of a 
city’s area of control, the city would also capture anyone residing within the newly defined city 
territory, thereby simultaneously increasing both the city’s land area and total population. People tend 
to think of China’s urbanization growth as vertical, and with the number of skyscrapers growing day 
by day, that perception can perhaps be forgiven, but urbanization is also horizontal as rural land is 
devoured by urban sprawl. 
 
Still, the urban population explosion is an important factor to track, something the Chinese 
government knows well. Chen (2006) states that China uses a “hukou, or household registration,” 
system (p. 101). It was designed by the Maoist era government as a tool to, “regulate and restrict 
population mobility and was one of the . . . instruments used by the Chinese government to push crash 
industrialization” (Chan & Buckingham, 2008: 587). Chan and Buckingham (2008) go on to note that 
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even 50 years after the hukou’s inception, “students in China consider the hukou, along with gender, 
age, and income, as one of the main variables defining exogenous constraints on individual behavior” 
(p. 582). 
 
Chan and Buckingham (2008) state that the hukou system differentiates between urban and rural 
residents, largely in a discriminatory fashion, and determines access not just to right to settle but also, 
“basic welfare and government-provided services enjoyed by urban residents, ranging from small 
things like being able to buy a city bus pass,” to larger issues like, “enrolling their children in public 
schools in cities where their parents work” (p. 583). The hukou system effectively keeps rural 
residents, “out of many urban jobs, except for those considered ‘dirty,’ dangerous or very low paying” 
(Chan and Buckingham, 2008: 583). The hukou system has not, however, prevented millions of rural 
migrants from flooding into cities in search of employment and opportunities that are simply 
unavailable to them in the poorly funded rural areas. 
 
Much like with issues of defining urban and urbanization, the hukou system presents a number of 
problems when addressing the wider issue of urbanization in China. If a rural resident moves into a 
city illegally, without altering their hukou status, would they be counted among the rural population, 
the urban population, or both? Population statistics, even official government figures, should be 
considered critically, but for the sake of this report, the larger trends remain evident and important.  
 
Modern urbanization trends 
Looking back into China’s recent history, the 1990 urban population in China was around 301 million. 
According to Chan and Hu (2003), pulling data from a number of sources including China’s national 
census, there were just under 302 million urban residents in China (26.41% of the total population at 
that time) by year’s end; but by the year 2000, that number rose dramatically to just over 459 million 
urban residents or about 36% of China’s total population (p. 58). Yearly urban population increases 
during the 1990s ranged anywhere from .59% to 1.42%, not quite the brisk rush into cities that 
occurred during the post-Mao era in the late 1970s and 1980s, but still quite significant.  
 
In 2010, with November 1 as the final deadline, China’s National Bureau of Statistics completed the 
sixth population census. According to the census figures, from 2000 to 2010, the urban population of 
China rose from around 459 million people (36% of the total population) to just over 665.5 million 
urban residents (49.68% of the total population). This is an increase of around 207 million people, 
representing an increase in the urban population of 13.46%.  
 
Though the Chinese government will not perform another official census until 2020, the World Bank 
(2014g) predicted that at some point during 2010, China finally crossed the urban/rural divide with 
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more than 50% of its citizens living in urban areas. The World Bank’s most recent figures from 2012 
suggest that around 52%, or approximately 702.5 million people, now live in China’s urban areas. Lall 
and Wang (2012) note that as of 2012, one out of ten people on the planet now lives in a Chinese city 
(p. 1).  
 
Urbanization costs and benefits 
By this point, it should be clear that despite a number of issues, China will continue to urbanize for the 
foreseeable future, though not at the brisk pace that occurred during the post-Mao era. What impact 
might this seemingly inevitable trend have on China’s economy moving forward into the 21st century?  
 
Lall and Wang (2012) note that cities are often economic drivers, stating that in China, “Economic 
prosperity is concentrated in large cities,” with 76% of urban exports coming from major cities while 
another 62% of total foreign capital investment occurs in these same larger cities (p. 2). Lall and Wang 
(2012) also state that, “A city’s manufacturing employment share, urban clustering, and access to 
international market are highly correlated with urban productivity” (p. 4). Bloom et al (2008) outline a 
number of reasons why urban areas are advantageous for economic growth: they allow for, 
“concentrated economic activities,” “offer large and diversified labor pools,” allowing for specialized 
industrial operations, efficiently disseminate public goods like transportation, education, and housing, 
as well as capitalize on the innovative ideas that might arise in an area of highly concentrated talent (p. 
772). The World Bank (2014f) largely agrees, referring to cities as the most efficient ways, “to provide 
water and sanitation to people living closer together, while access to health, education, and other social 
and cultural services is also much more readily available.”  
 
Despite these possible benefits, Bloom et al (2008) found that even though, “a country’s population 
living in urban areas is highly correlated with its level of income,” there is in fact, “no evidence that 
the level of urbanization affects the rate of economic growth” (p. 772). Though a contestable claim, 
there is evidence to suggest that urbanization is a byproduct of economic success rather than a core 
driver perhaps particularly in the case of China. Though urbanization is incredibly important for an 
economy, particularly as it relates to creating a domestic consumer market, urbanization might better 
be conceived as an organic offshoot of traditional economic success. That being said, Bloom et al 
(2006) insist that though, “urban development is important,” and the needs of the world’s urban 
population will require skillful governmental regulation, the outcome of their research states, “that 
policies specifically aimed at accelerating, or retarding urbanization are unlikely to speed up economic 
development” (p. 775).  
 
Bloom and his team’s findings are supported by China-specific examples presented by other scholars. 
Chen (2006) states that, “the urbanization rate in China has lagged behind the rate of industrialization 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
 
P a g e  | 45 
that is measured as the proportion of GDP contributed by the second sector (i.e. manufacturing, 
construction . . . roughly, service)” (p. 101). People moving into the cities are not able to contribute as 
much toward economic growth as their numbers would suggest. Despite a more liberal economic 
market, foreign direct investment, and China’s own domestic economic plan, urban industrialization 
has not been able to keep pace with the number of citizens migrating into the city. Here we can see the 
logic of the hukou system that was used at least in part to control these potentially contentious 
population flows. But government plans do little to stop the movement of people looking for a better 
life.  
 
Furthermore, China’s GDP continues to rise and will likely do so for the foreseeable future, but there 
is a growing disparity between provinces as well as within them. Chen (2006) notes that many 
provinces and larger cities along the eastern seaboard, “have the most highly urbanized populations 
and industrialized labor forces,” while much of the rest of the country, “western provinces, 
autonomous regions,” and mountainous regions have comparatively low numbers of urban areas and 
industrialized labor forces. These two trends, broadly speaking China’s richer east versus China’s 
poorer west, roughly correlate, “with both regional and within-region income disparities”; in effect, 
the rural/urban income disparity in richer provinces is much lower than the income disparity in poorer 
provinces (Chen, 2006:105).  
 
Yang (1999), analyzing the issue of income disparity, states that this, “rise in sectorial disparity has 
resulted from increased urban subsidies, investments, and credits, which have affected higher 
inflationary taxes on rural earnings” (p. 310). Yang (1999) goes on to note that the income disparities 
that exist between the eastern cities and provinces and the western regions have not only immediate 
effects on the, “economic incentives of the workers,” but also impact, “the human-capital attainments 
of their children, which may further widen the rural-urban income gap” (p. 310). Again, the efforts of 
Chinese government to support both the economic and social wellbeing of their citizens by promoting 
urbanization in its many forms can be seen as having a somewhat detrimental effect on economic 
growth as it relates to disadvantaged rural residents and their children. This has the potential to spiral 
outward into future generations and affect China’s national economy by decreasing the diversity of its 
labor pool in a time of slowing urban growth. 
 
Chen (2006) largely concurs with Bloom and his team’s assessment in that, “top-down government 
initiatives, such as upgrading towns into cities,” thereby giving them access to more funds and ideally 
creating higher degrees of industrialization, is a tactic that needs to be reassessed (p. 125). In the case 
of Fujian Province, Chen’s (2006) area of study, more attention should be paid not to forced 
industrialization but to urbanizing in such a way as to address, “the challenge of transforming a low-
value-added economy” (p. 125). It is not simply a matter of reorganization and funding. Urbanization 
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campaigns must be conceived of and implemented in an intelligent and reasoned way; China cannot 
expect to throw money at cities and hope for them to become successful.  
 
Again, China’s national GDP continues to rise, and industrially-linked urbanization has played a major 
role in this rapid growth, but zooming down even to the provincial level of analysis creates a different 
picture of very disparate economies with sharp distinctions between the rich east and the poor western 
and autonomous regions. While GDP growth continues to trend upward, this disparity may go 
unnoticed, but income disparities may lead to future labor issues that may hamper continued, 
necessary growth. Social stability will also be affected if the CCP’s urbanization policies—almost 
certainly harmful to the environment and likely to produce feelings of disenfranchisement—cannot 
meet the primary goal of pulling its population out of poverty.   
 
Urbanization recommendations 
Both as a matter of policy and as a matter of necessity, China will continue its process of urbanization, 
though at a slower pace than in the past. Still, Lall and Wang (2012) note that by 2030, around 1 
billion of China’s citizens will live in urban environments, an increase of almost 300 million over 
today’s current urban population (p. 1). The Chinese government’s push toward the city is 
understandable in light of the difficulties of doling out public goods to a rural populace. And as stated 
above, though urbanization appears to be more of an outgrowth of economic growth rather than a 
cause, it creates interesting opportunities for industrial specialization. Still, the process of urbanization 
in a country the size of China needs to be studied, analyzed, and regulated with caution and care. 
 
Rural residents, deprived of the relative abundance of public goods and job opportunities available in 
urban centers, will continue to migrate into the city in defiance of their hukou status. Surely some of 
the migrants will do well and succeed in this endeavor, but many will end up in difficult and 
dangerous jobs while their families and the workers themselves will continue to have limited access to 
public goods. This lack of access in urban areas, coupled with de-urbanization in rural areas and 
continued income disparity, has the potential to damage both the current labor pool as well as future 
generations not to mention the impacts on society. 
 
Clearly the hukou system needs to be reformed. This reform would not only create more social 
stability by dealing with income disparity, but would allow for the freer flow of labor around the 
country, letting migrants go where they are needed rather than where they might be able to more 
immediately find work and possible access to social support. There has been progress in this regard. 
According to the World Bank report (2014e), cities may soon be abandoning the hukou system and 
moving toward a system, “based on residency, allowing [cities] to eventually provide 260 million 
migrants with basic public services.” More information on possible hukou developments will be laid 
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out in the following section of this report. Regardless, the best laid plans of the central government 
may end up falling apart due to corruption, poor management, or profit-seeking predatory 
organizations; this is the danger of forcing urbanization in an inorganic fashion and expecting 
urbanized regions to succeed. The wave of urbanization shall continue, and provided China does not 
succumb to this wave, economic progress will not likely be hampered greatly in the near future. 
 
Even as reforms in the cities move forward, China may continue to urbanize rural regions, a tactic that 
may backfire. Liu et al (2004), studying urbanization in the Three Gorges Reservoir Area, suggested 
that government leaders pursuing industrial development in their areas consider, “whether or not 
industry can provide enough jobs for rural laborers,” while also coupling this trend with additional 
educational opportunities in the area which would allow for new arrivals from rural areas a greater 
capacity to work in other non-agricultural jobs after the macro engineering projects are completed (p. 
233). Education for the rural worker’s children might also be an ideal investment in the region’s future. 
 
In March of 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang released a government working report that outlines a 
wide range of domestic goals for the upcoming year. Xinhua News Agency (2014c) highlighted some 
of these goals: the addition of 10 million urban jobs, ensuring urban unemployment does not rise 
above 4.6%, and an investment of 457.6 billion Yuan into government projects in the less developed 
central and western regions of China. Xinhua News Agency (2014c), quoting the government report, 
noted that, “carrying out a new type of people-centered urbanization” would be a major task in 2014. 
China Daily (2014), quoting information released by Xinhua News Agency, stated that this new form 
of urbanization would, “grant rural people who live in the cities more social welfare,” currently denied 
them due to their hukou status; furthermore, Premier Li promised that the central government would, 
“grant urban residency to around 100 million rural people,” that have migrated into the cities as well 
as, “guide the urbanization of around 100 million rural residents of the central and western regions in 
cities.” These sentiments largely shadow China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, which initiated, “new spending 
programs [that] target the development of an inclusive countryside with the objective to reduce the 
existing sharp rural urban disparities in public service delivery” (Lall &Wang, 2012: 5).  
 
China needs cities. Cities, though perhaps not the economic drivers that the government believes them 
to be, allow for the more efficient and productive use of labor and capital. Furthermore, cities allow 
for the efficient dissemination of public goods, an effort that will go a long way in supporting social 
stability. It is important to realize, however, that pushing people into cities, or reclassifying rural areas 
to provide them more funds for development, will not ensure economic prosperity. The rush towards 
urbanization must be carefully managed, with the needs of the urban residents—including public 
goods, employment opportunities, and the environment—must be taken into consideration. It is also 
important that inefficiency or corruption be curtailed as high degrees of government waste will likely 
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only lead to massive cities with shoddy infrastructure and limited economic potential. 
 
It is hard to generalize the future direction of urbanization efforts in China as different provinces and 
different city and prefectural leaders will react differently to future urbanization campaigns. It appears 
that leaders are trying to push people-centric urbanization rather than using cities as direct economic 
drivers. At the very least, this demonstrates that government leaders recognize the roles cities will play 
in the future of China’s economic growth: they will create markets and specialized labor pools, rather 
than being factory cities. Still, the continuing disconnect between central and local leaders will lead to 
inefficiency, corruption, and waste, almost certainly hampering economic growth. Continued 
urbanization is inevitable, and with people as the focus, China will likely move forward successfully, 
in that cities will not be too heavy a burden on the economy. Much of the success or failure of 
urbanization reforms will rely on the hukou issue discussed below.  
 
3.2.3: Hukou system 
Much has already been said about the increasing importance of the hukou system. Indeed, the 
household registration system in China has emerged as one of the key factors in China’s economic 
transition. In fact, after the renewed engagement of the government to allow the private sector to play 
a stronger role in the Chinese economy, the reform of the hukou, or the household registration system, 
came in a strong second place for the most important message to come out of the Third Plenum 
Meeting.  
 
The household registration system is a government record of all families in China. In the early years of 
the Communist Party, this was a way to control the movements of the population to avoid 
overpopulation issues. However, as China began its rapid industrialization, the migration of workers 
became a foundation for the success of the Chinese economic growth model. According to 
government data, there are currently 260 million migrant workers who live in cities, but are not 
eligible to receive public services and benefits such as education and healthcare in that city because 
they are registered in their hometown. This has created a form of legalized discrimination, which is 
even more distressing given that the success of the China model rests largely on those migrant workers. 
Oddly enough, the outflow of migrant workers from cities is also a problem as many return to their 
hometown when they are ready to settle down and have a family largely to ensure they have access to 
government-sponsored services for their family members. According to the latest population census, 
conducted by the government in 2010, almost 261.4 million Chinese had lived outside their locality of 
household registration for over six months. That is an increase of almost 117 million people or 81% 
from the previous census, which was conducted 10 years earlier.  
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Now that China is facing many demographic issues such as an ageing population and a shrinking 
overall labor force, migrant workers are needed more than ever to ensure the smooth transition from 
the old fixed asset investment and export-led growth method to the consumption-based one. The 
hukou system is likely the largest obstacle to urbanization.  So far, the Third Plenum and subsequent 
government officials’ statements leady many to believe that a reform of the household registration 
system will be completed in the next fifteen to twenty years.  The debate is now open on the cost of 
such a significant reform.  
 
Based on many estimates and surveys, the cost will range between 20,000 Yuan, per migrant worker 
in small cities and could be as high as 100,000 Yuan in larger cities. That is, an astronomical 23 
trillion Yuan or 44% of China’s 2012 GDP if all migrant workers were to transfer household 
registration in one year. Of course, the central government has announced that this reform will be 
gradually phased out and China Macro Strategist Andy Rothman suggests that a three-way split 
between the Party, employers and employees would further reduce the cost. With the government 
assuming one-third of the cost, and assuming that the first phase of the reform would “urbanize” 20 
million migrant workers, it brings the cost to about 1.3% of China’s 2012 GDP. Professor at the 
University of Washington, Kam Wing Chan goes even further in terms of affordability of the reform 
and insists that the amount estimated to urbanize migrant workers is not spent in one year of 
urbanization, but over their remaining lifetime. “The average migrant worker is between 27 or 30 
years old; assuming he or she lives for a further 40 years, the annual cost would be 2,500 Yuan a year 
per person. In other words, offering urban hukou to 20 million people per year would cost 50 billion 
Yuan or 0.1% of China’s GDP instead” (Chan, 2013). We can further estimate the cost of this reform 
based on the proportion it represents to the government’s total revenues. According to Professor Chan, 
even considering that the cost of the reform would increase each year, it would still be affordable for 
China at 6% of the government revenues in 2012, because it represents only a fraction of the annual 
growth of such revenues in the past two years, i.e. 23% in 2011 and 13% in 2012 (Chan, 2013). But 
the benefits of such reform will also be great.  
 
Firstly, it will contribute to reducing the risk of social instability. Second, and as already mentioned, it 
will increase the supply of migrant workers. Thirdly, it should also result in an improvement of 
domestic consumption, since as workers’ social safety nets are increased in their city of residence, 
workers will no longer need to maintain precautionary savings. These last two factors are critical to the 
successful transition of the Chinese economic model and the key question of this project. The Chinese 
government is deeply aware of this and for this reason, reforms of the household registration will be 
carried out. 
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The biggest challenge to come out of the hukou reform will come from local governments who will 
bear the burden of cost of such reform. These governments are reluctant to see their social spending 
dramatically increase by the attribution of urban hukou to all of these migrant workers, particularly in 
areas that host significant numbers of migrant workers. Guangdong province for example, which is a 
major factory hub, counts as many as three to four million migrant workers in a total population of 10 
million. But again, as this is such a crucial reform for the economic development of the country, and 
the CCP, the central government will use the mechanisms already in place to transfer the needed funds 
to other echelons of governments. Another way to tackle this challenge may be explained by the 
prudent first phase of reforms announced by the authorities. As Rothman argues, “a limited reform 
program will be much easier to sell to local officials nervous about their budgets. If the initial stages 
go smoothly, it can then be expanded with less pushback.” (Rothman, 2013b). Officials may increase 
pace of reform to extent it much quicker as millions of migrant workers receive urban hukous and 
pressure grows on the government to speed up the process. 
 
Thus, a successful reform of the household registration system is to be expected. The supply of 
migrant workers in China will therefore be increased and consumption levels should also continue to 
rise. However, the overall success of the reform will rest on the government’s ability to also pursue a 
successful overall urbanization plan, which we will explore in greater detail in a subsequent section of 
this paper. In the longer term, the government will also need to ensure that these migrant workers have 
enough confidence in the system to renounce their rural hukou rights in order to gain an urban hukou. 
That means forfeiting money associated with the renunciation of their rural land, but also the 
confidence that they will be ensured social services in the city. On the renouncing of their land rights, 
the government has recognized that this is too complex an issue to resolve in the near future and has 
pledged to make it clear to the migrant workers that they will not be required to forfeit their rural land 
rights to obtain urban hukou.  
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Chapter 4: Supporting Reforms 
How broad and in-depth the reforms outlined in the previous chapters will be is heavily dependent on 
the amount of social support for these reforms. Two key factors in this support that need the attention 
of the government this report has analyzed, are social policy and the environment. Reforms in these 
areas are needed for both economic and social political reasons. Both reforms are a balancing act, 
however; the government needs to balance the social impact and the financial cost of supporting 
reforms. Doing nothing is not an option; not only does this have the potential to create severe social 
unrest, the quality of growth will also suffer.  
 
Section 4.1: Social policy reform 
A strong middle class and an economic growth model based on domestic consumption will require the 
government to implement major social policy reforms. Too many Chinese workers still feel their 
situation is overly precarious to be confident consumers. Successfully implemented social policies will 
also contribute to reducing income disparity and inequalities, which in turn will contribute to avoiding 
social tensions and instability. CCP officials continuously repeat that social stability is of foremost 
importance in the pursuit of continued economic growth and in ensuring the party’s future. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, social policy reforms can also contribute to China’s economic growth. For 
example, as China faces significant demographic issues, such as shortage of labor force and the 
world’s largest ageing population, reforms on retirement age and education will be crucial. For the 
purpose of this research we will focus on significant social policy reforms that are needed for a 
successful transition to a developed economy in three areas: health-care, demographic policies, 
pension, and education. 
 
4.1.1: Overview 
China’s government spending on social programs has increased significantly in recent years. 
According to the OECD Social Expenditure Database, “in 2012, it stood at 9% of GDP, exceeding the 
levels in some other emerging economies, (i.e. Mexico or India), but standing below the OECD 
average (21.8%), Russia (15.5%), and Brazil (16.3%).” In 2011, the government released its 12th 
Five-Year plan in which it projected public social expenditure to further increase and rise faster than 
GDP, which is expected to stabilize at around 7% in the coming years. The Five-Year Plan also stated 
that a social security system covering all residents, from urban and rural areas would be put into place 
by 2020. While China has, in about a decade, created a basic welfare-system comparable to that of 
some developed countries in just the fraction of the time, the Chinese system remains inefficient and 
inaccessible to many. But it is still an improvement from the previous system, under which a little over 
10% of the rural population was covered by the country’s medical insurance system.  
 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
 
P a g e  | 52 
Chinese authorities have maintained that: “the ‘fundamental end’ of economic transformation is to 
improve people's lives, which could only be achieved by improving social welfare system (…), 
unswervingly realize the shared prosperity and bring the benefits to the people.” In line with this, the 
Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP proposed to direct 30% of the profits of state-
owned enterprises, currently estimated at 400 billion US Dollars, into so called ‘social safety nets.’  
 
4.1.2: Health care system reforms 
According to a McKinsey& Company report, “If China’s health care spending simply keeps pace with 
projected GDP growth, it will to 480 billion US Dollars by 2018” (McKinsey& Company, 2010). 
Improvement of the health care system is a core component of the ‘social-safety nets,’ and as then 
China’s Vice Premier, now Premier Li Keqiang said in 2011: reforms will aim “to establish a 
universal basic health-care system providing safe, effective, convenient, and low-cost health-care 
services by 2020” (as quoted in McKinsey& Company, 2010).  
 
Changes have been underway since 2009 and noteworthy reforms have already been implemented. 
These reforms include: the generalization of the minimum subsistence allowance to the countryside, 
new medical insurance schemes for people with rural registration status, dependents of registered 
urban employees and students, and the introduction of a new pension system for people living in the 
countryside and another for migrant workers. 
 
Overtime, the Chinese government should aim to implement a universal, and mostly financed by tax 
income, health care system worthy of a developed country. However, for now, the harmonization of 
the benefits across different health insurance schemes and insuring efficiency of the administration 
should be the primary focus of the government. For this, the use of electronic health records could be 
expanded and measures to regularly monitor the quality and cost of the system should be implemented. 
These should not necessitate major increase in costs, but rather require better allocation of resources.  
 
Overall, thorough integration of the social policy with the economic policy will be needed to ensure 
the successful implementation of the reforms. A good example of this is the situation of the current 
household registration system, which was studied in greater details in a previous section of this report. 
As it stands, a person is only allowed social benefits in the area where they are registered. This affects 
in larger part migrant workers who leave their rural hometowns to go and work in the factories mostly 
located in cities. These workers who have been instrumental in China’s amazing economic growth, are 
not allowed basic health and education services for their children in the city where they work and live. 
As China is facing a potential major shortage of labor force, the authorities will need to ensure that the 
mobility of millions of farmers is supported. Specifically, the authorities will need to ensure that 
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migrant workers are provided with education, health services and minimum social benefits in their 
residential area.  
 
One of the many explanations for Latin America’s failure at developing a sustainable growth model 
economy is the regions longstanding inequality and the failure of the governments’ social policies to 
respond to this issue. Latin America’s failure at overcoming its profound income distribution 
inequality rests in the lack of political consensus that it creates. China, with its unique political regime 
will not face this issue, but if China is to be successful, it will need to learn from other countries’ 
mistakes and successes and ensure that these are adapted to its specific conditions. 
 
On funding, the Central government should assume the majority of the burden and ensure adequate 
mechanisms are in place for an even redistribution to all areas of the country, rich and poor. A good 
example of this are federations around the world where the federal government collects taxes from 
provinces and redistributes funds to ensure equality on certain services for all citizens. 
 
4.1.3: Demographic policies 
There are several social policies that can be implemented to ease the cost of much-needed social 
reforms, but also to prepare for an ageing population. One of the major announcements to come out of 
the Third Plenum on social reforms was the relaxation of the long-standing one-child policy. While the 
news was received with optimism as a step in the right direction for the advancement of human rights, 
and it is also to contribute to maintaining a positive perception of the government, its effect on 
economic growth should be insignificant. According to Deputy Director of the National Health and 
Family Planning Committee, Wang Peian, the ending of the one-child policy is unlikely to change the 
longer-term trend towards a lower fertility rate as well. The pressures of modern life, i.e. urbanization, 
rising costs of food, housing, education, and Confucian traditions lead couples to have smaller families. 
Realizing this, the national health and family planning commission announced during the 2014 
National People’s Congress that it would study the impacts of a universal two-child policy. According 
to the commission, such a policy would increase the population by 10 million people each year. While 
such a baby boom could bring a lot of pressure on society, many sociology scholars in the country 
have called for further steps towards a complete abolishment of birth control policies to respond to 
increasing demographic issues, including labor force shortages and the world’s largest ageing 
population. However, according to demographic experts, this is something that is unlikely to be 
introduced before the 2020 Five-Year Plan. 
 
A better way to deal with an increasing aging population will be to make changes to the current 
retirement age, which is still very low compared with developed nations at 60 years old for men, 55 
for white-collar women and 50 for blue-collar women. According to the World Bank, these retirement 
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ages were set at a time when China’s life expectancy was about 50 years old. It has since then 
increased by more than 20 years, to 75 years old. Most OECD countries have an average effective age 
at which older workers withdraw from the labor force at closer to 70 years old. Realizing that this will 
present a major challenge in dealing with an ageing population and a shortage of labor force, a 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security said that the government was 
looking at lifting the retirement age to keep in line with the rising life expectancy. According to the 
article by the South China Morning Post, the ministry will gauge opinion and will propose detailed 
ideas to top leaders “on condition that a consensus is gradually reached when the time is right.” (Zuo, 
SCMP, 2014) However, a survey conducted by the Canton Public Opinion Research Center in April 
2013 reveals that 54% of respondents opposed the lifting of the retirement age and only 26% showed 
support.  
 
As in most developed countries, raising the age of retirement – aligning the genders then linking to life 
expectancy – is both a crucial and inexpensive way to increase labor productivity. The increase of the 
retirement age in OECD countries has proven to deliver positive results for economic growth both in 
the short and long terms. According to a 2013 report by the organization, “Ensuring adequate labor 
force participation by older women and men is often essential for the adaptation of pension systems to 
demographic changes” (OECD, 2013).  
 
A study by the Australian National University clearly outlines how higher aged participation, rather 
than higher fertility, is the best option to increasing the workforce. 
 
According to a study by the Australian National University, “Male 60+ participation is set to raise 
from 24% in 1997 to 43 % in 2030, while female participation rises from 4% to 21%.” (Golley & 
Tyers, 2006) This has an economical effect of 8.7% to real GDP. Chinese authorities should 
implement a gradual lift of the retirement age in line with its different regions’ life expectancy. 
 
4.1.4: Pension system 
In conjunction to the lifting of the retirement age, the reform of the pension system must remain a 
social priority for the Chinese government. According to a research paper prepared for the World 
Bank, “A serious obstacle to China’s economic reform is the lack of an effective and sustainable 
pension system.” (Yan et al, 2001). On this too, the results of initial reforms are evident. In 2000, 
around 100 million Chinese citizens, less than 10% of the population, were covered by the pension 
system, most of them city residents. Today, almost 700 million are covered. This is a good step, but 
much more needs to be done in the coming years. It is crucial that Chinese have the confidence that 
they do not need to save excessively to ensure decent living conditions during retirement. 
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In February 2014, the State Council announced that it would merge the pension systems for urban and 
rural residents at the national level and adjust how it subsidized payments for provinces. As of 
February 2014, 15 provinces have already combined the two systems. However, despite many reform 
initiatives, the system remains fragmented and raises issues of efficiency as we are observing the 
emergence of a complementary private system. The current pension system operates under a multi-
pillar system, which combines different components, such “pay-as-you-go,” a mandatory individual 
account and a voluntary supplementary scheme. The government should extend the current coverage 
from a basic pension to a universal state pension system that does not differentiate between rural, 
urban, and migrant individuals. Improvements to the administration of the system are also needed. For 
that, the Central government will need to ensure that local governments are provided with sufficient 
resources to cope with the financial pressure resulting from the current arrangements.  
 
China should emulate Sweden’s successful “notional” defined-contribution pension system. Under this 
system, benefits are adjusted according to average life expectancy and economic growth, which has 
the benefit of ensuring system sustainability and the contribution rate is fixed so financial 
commitments for future plan funding are known in advance. 
 
It is possible for the Chinese government to implement significant reform to its pension system at a 
minimal cost to GDP. The transition cost to move to a reformed system could be financed by various 
taxes, such as a corporate tax, a value-added tax, a personal income tax, and a final demand tax. The 
study prepared for the World Bank estimated that, “The annual transition cost is estimated at around 
0.6% of GDP between 2000 and 2010 and decline to 0.3% by 2050.” (Yan et al, 2001). 
 
4.1.5: Education 
While these are all steps in the right direction, much remains to be done for China to successfully face 
the challenges ahead. Forecasts vary, but China analysts agree that the country’s labor market could be 
approaching a turning point. According to a 2013 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers’ on Global wage 
projections to 2030, China will become more significant as a consumer market and other South East 
Asian countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam could take over 
from China as a key low cost production hub. One crucial factor to successfully prepare for such 
transition and keep a strong human capital factor lies in education. “Sustaining growth to high income 
level will require improvements in the skills of many workers and young people who lack the 
education required to prosper in an increasingly sophisticated economy.” (Lim et al, 2011) Major 
reforms will be needed in China’s education system at both the higher and lower levels. 
 
South Korea provides the best example of a country that successfully absorbed the significantly high 
number of university graduates. The key to this success seems to lie with a large decline in relative 
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earnings of graduates. As will happen in China, the rising level of education will mean that skilled 
workers will be available at a relatively cheaper price and this will shift the country’s comparative 
advantage into more skilled-intensive manufactures and services. For this, China’s economy’s 
sectorial structure will also need to be adapted.  
 
Learning from the experiences of the US and the UK, China should also improve its lower education 
levels, particularly in the rural areas, as to reduce the burden of a poorly educated underclass in a 
modern economy. It will serve to avoid both the major waste of human resources and source of 
income inequality in which it can result. This has to be a priority of the government as the children 
who are educated in the next decade will be part of the labor force for the next generation. 
 
4.1.6: Social policy projection 
In order for the Chinese economy to successfully transition to that of a developed country, reforms to 
the social sector will be crucial, particularly in health care, pension, and education. For the time being, 
unemployment benefits remain a luxury in China. The proportion of the unemployed receiving 
benefits is comparable to South Africa at about 10%. There are many other priorities that need to be 
addressed and that are sufficient to ensure the successful transition of the economic model. It is 
imperative that the Chinese government be mindful not to rush into adopting too many reforms, but 
rather take a gradual approach. While some of China’s cities have the GDP of some of Europe’s 
developed countries, it still very much remains a developing country and should not embark on too 
many high costs social reforms. 
 
The government should focus on implementing essential social reforms to secure its growth, i.e. to 
support a stronger middle-class and domestic consumption and measures proposed above will be 
sufficient to achieve that. Most China experts have stated that the recent CCP Third Plenum could be a 
turning point in the country’s development. On social policies, as in many other sectors, only time and 
implementation will tell of the results to be expected. China’s announcement in early 2014, that its 
GDP growth hit a lowest point in recent years and particularly, further comments by Chinese 
government officials that they are willing to see GDP growth drop further to ensure reforms is 
certainly a good sign for social policy reform hopefuls. While it is difficult to predict future policy 
implementation and their potential success in China, strong government commitment leads us to be 
optimistic. Moreover, as this chapter demonstrates, these reforms are instrumental in fulfilling the 
government’s economic agenda. 
 
4.2: Environment 
Where in the past the Chinese government focused mainly on the output of its economy, sustainability 
and the protection of China's environment are becoming more important, if not vital, challenges the 
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government has in transforming its economic model. The current economic growth model is having a 
severely negative influence on the environment and increasing the economic cost of environmental 
degradation. The large 'dirty' industry in China is characterized by high levels of emissions. At first 
glance, this increased environmental degradation cost is a logical consequence of the process of 
industrialization. One only has to look at the history of Western powers and their process of 
industrialization and the accompanied pollution problems to see the same phenomenon. In 1952, for 
example, the smog and pollution in London (and other major industrial centers) reached such a drastic 
level that the mortality rates in these centers drastically increased (Bell et al, 2003). 
 
Looking at history would therefore suggest that China’s current negative impact on the environment is 
nothing new and will follow the same ‘cleaner’ Western model for economic growth in the future. The 
drive for sustainability in China, however, is unique when compared to industrialized (mostly Western) 
countries. Whereas issues in sustainability are usually historically linked to private consumption, in 
China it is the industrial processes which are supporting China's economic development model that 
provide the sustainability issues (Brubaker, n.d.). China’s environment and sustainability issues are 
severe and there is no clear cut policy solution to these problems. It is often hypothesized that 
environmental protection and economic policy are in competition and negatively affect the opposing 
factor’s outcome (European Commission, n.d.). This means that China has to make a clear decision as 
to how committed it is to finding a sustainable solution in the trade off against the economy. This trade 
off will affect the future of China and can even affect its ability to transform the economy. To analyze 
the impact of China’s environmental policy first an outline will be given of the cost of environmental 
degradation to the GDP. Second, a projection will be provided on what is achievable for China looking 
forward to 2030. This projection will be held up against China’s actual policy and its possibility of 
success. Finally a conclusion can be derived and a realistic image of China’s economic future with 
regards to the environment can be presented. 
 
4.2.1: Cost of environmental degradation 
Air pollution 
Air pollution is one of the clearest consequences of China's industry-heavy economic growth model. 
China has some of the most polluted cities in the world with Beijing competing with New Delhi, India, 
for the top spot (Busch, 2014). Not only does the air pollution have a clear financial consequence, it 
also creates social instability since it is one of the most obvious effects of environmental degradation 
that is directly visible to the general population. According to the World Bank, the cost of air pollution 
and its negative effect on health accounts for157.3 billion Yuan, roughly 1.16% of the total GDP 
(2003 statistics). This number can even be increased to 3.8% of the GDP when analyzing the extra 
money the general population is willing to spend to avoid mortality risks (World Bank, 2007). 
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The severity of air pollution in China is not a new phenomenon but has been a common characteristic 
in Western or other Asian countries during their periods of industrialization. This pattern does not 
mean that China should underestimate the cost of air pollution to the GDP; it took a concentrated 
effort from Japan, whose air quality in the 1960s is comparable to modern Beijing, to bring its 
pollution under control and it will require the same of China (Midori, n.d.). 
 
Water pollution 
China accounts for around20% of the world's population while at the same time only has 7% of the 
global fresh water supply (Adams& Ma, 2013).This scarcity is exacerbated by the polluting effect of 
China's industry on the country's water supplies. In 2013, China's government calculated that 90% of 
the groundwater was polluted while at the same time 25% of the country's rivers were polluted to such 
an extent that they could be used for neither agriculture nor industry. Furthermore, 70% of the rivers in 
China are polluted from frequent use by chemical or textile plants. This has caused severe health 
issues as well; so called 'cancer villages' are sprouting up alongside these polluted waterways (Garland, 
2013).The water scarcity due to pollution is calculated to cost 147 billion Yuan year or roughly 1% of 
the China's GDP (calculated in 2003) (World Bank, 2007). 
 
Desertification/Deforestation 
Desertification due to overgrazing or misuse of water resources in both industry and agriculture is a 
very big problem in China's economic model. More than one quarter of China's landmass is either 
desert or in the process of desertification (Patience, 2011).Desertification has three different 
subfields—agriculture, siltation, and transportation—and each carries a hefty price tag. Agriculture is 
affected due to the loss in soil nutrition and animal husbandry. Siltation due to desertification can be 
found in rivers, reservoirs, and irrigation canals. Transportation is affected due to railway and highway 
facility loss as a result of sand-blown disasters. Another factor influenced by these disasters is the 
increased cost in the airline industry due to delays and cancellations of flights. It was calculated by a 
Chinese high ranking official that with China's current desertification policy it will take around 300 
years to restore areas hit by desertification (Patience, 2011). Several respected researchers have tried 
to make an estimation of the costs with varying results. The average cost in 1999 according to the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification was roughly 1% of China's GDP (UNCCD, 
2013). 
 
Crop and material damage 
The cost to natural resources also attributes to the cost of environmental degradation, although to a 
lesser extent than the effects previously mentioned. Acid rain costs about37 billion Yuan annually; 30 
billion Yuan due to crop damage and 7 billion Yuan in material damage. Agricultural output is also 
affected due to polluted irrigation sources. Since 90% of the groundwater and 25% of the river ways 
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are severely polluted, the risk of using polluted water in agriculture is present. It is estimated that 
polluted water irrigation costs 7 billion Yuan, subtracted from the agricultural output. Water pollution 
also affects fisheries which see their aggregate income diminish to an extent of 4 billion Yuan (World 
Bank, 2007). 
 
Total cost 
The problem with making an estimate of the total cost of environmental degradation in China is the 
wide variety in research methods and criteria used by different agencies. The World Bank, for example, 
estimates the total cost of environmental degradation to be 5.78% (World Bank, 2007) while the 
Chinese government calculated the cost to be at 3.5% (Wong, 2013). The World Bank actually 
corrected its own 5.8% cost using additional factors in natural resource degradation to a whopping 9% 
(of total Gross National Income) environmental degradation cost (World Bank, 2012).Important to 
note is that these numbers are already deducted from the total GDP in calculating the GDP growth of 
that year. So the 7.7% GDP growth in 2013 has already taken the environmental degradation cost, 
whether 9%, 5.78%, or 3.5%, into account (Wang& Yao, 2014). The Chinese industry and 
manufacturing sector keeps growing however which will increase the total cost environmental 
degradation unless China finds a way to put a halt to, or even diminish, environmental degradation. 
Even though the current situation looks very bleak, there are opportunities for the Chinese government 
to cope with environmental degradation and develop a more sustainable economic model.  
 
4.2.2: China's sustainable cost projections 
McKinsey& Company outlined two different future projections for China's environmental policy 
called the 'baseline' and 'abatement' projection with 2030 as final projection (McKinsey& Company, 
2009). The baseline projection is based on current technological investments and policy in China. In 
short, the baseline represents China's current policy towards environmental degradation and 
sustainability. It will still take a concentrated effort from the Chinese government to implement this 
policy and is in no way a guarantee of current Chinese policy. The abatement projection takes it a step 
further and requires no less than an actual ‘green revolution’ in China. This projection looks at current 
and expected technological developments and construes a Chinese policy that heavily invests in 
sustainable technologies. This investment is on top of the already existing baseline scenario. It gives 
the ‘best case scenario’ for China’s economy with the maximum feasible sustainability incorporated.  
The abatement scenario follows a model which would mean a 1.5-2.5% GDP investment projected in 
2030. It is important to note, however, that this is an investment with limited returns since only one 
third of the investment will have a profitable return, one third will come at a medium cost, and one 
third will come at a high cost. The capital investment needed for the abatement projection is outlined 
in the Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Capital needed for abatement options, (McKinsey& Company, 2009) 
 
This would mean that China should spend 35 billion Euros annually, between 2011 and 2015, in order 
to reach the abatement goals. The Chinese government actually outlined its environmental investment 
plans in its 12th Five-Year Plan on environment in which it stated it would invest a total of 3.4 trillion 
Yuan total between 2011 and 2015 (China State Council, 2011). Compared to the total investment of 
the 11th Five-Year Plan, which amounts to 1.4 trillion Yuan between 2006 and 2010 (an average of 
1.35% of the GDP), this means an increase of 41% or 2 trillion Yuan (Bloomberg News, 2009). This 
would amount to a total of investment of 37.5 billion Euros annually between 2011 and 2015.7 
 
Financially it seems that China is actually on par with the abatement projection outlined by McKinsey 
& Company and is actually investing more than required to meet the end state of the projection (35 
billion Euros annually). One problem with the monetary statistics outlined in China’s 12thFive-Year 
Plan is that it does not give a clear and objective representation of China’s actual investment into a 
sustainable economy. In 2007, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) noted that 
roughly half the money spent on environmental protection is either lost through corruption or spent on 
non-environmental projects (Economy, 2013). So even though statistics show that China is actually 
spending more than outlined in the abatement projection, the actual investment figure should be set at 
18.75 billion Euros, which is 53% of the required investment needed for the abatement projection.  
                                                          
71RMB is 0.093923 Euro (2005 number) 2 trillion x 0.093923 = 187,846 billion Euro. 187,846/5 = 37,569.2 
billion Euros annually. 
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Since it can be reasoned that China will not reach the abatement projection outlined in the McKinsey& 
Company report, the baseline projection and its feasibility have to be analyzed. This baseline 
projection is based on current policy and technological developments on which the Chinese 
government already focuses. The problem, however, is that in its drive for a sustainable economy, the 
Chinese government is unable to obtain the emission goals it has set out for itself. The 11th Five-Year 
Plan outlined clear emission goals for China's sustainable policy but the government was not able to 
reach these goals. Energy intensity per unit of GDP was supposed to be reduced by 20% but only a 
total of 19.1% was achieved (Cohen, & Siu, 2012).In the 12th Five-Year Plan this trend has continued 
since China again seems unable to fulfill the goals set out in the plan. The energy intensity is supposed 
to fall an additional 16% in the 12th Five-Year Plan but it had only dropped 5.5% by the end of 2012 
(Stanway, 20130.Regarding new technological investments, the Chinese government is also falling 
behind its own strategy. While China aims to increase its dependency on non-fossil fuels to a total of 
11.4% between 2011 and 2015, only an increase of 0.8% to 9.4% was obtained in the first two years of 
the Five-Year Plan. One reason for China's failure to meet the environmental goals of the 11th Five-
Year Plan is that environmental plans were based on a GDP growth of 8% while the actual GDP 
growth during these years was 10.7% (Zhang, n.d.).This is caused by a difference in strategy between 
the national and provincial authorities. While Beijing aims to set a countrywide aim of for example 
8%, provincial leaders see economic growth as more important and strive for higher GDP growth in 
their specific province with numbers reaching up to 13% (Cohen, & Siu, 2012). The problem is, 
therefore, not easily solved by an increase in budget since the fault lies with implementation of policy.  
  
4.2.3: Realistic projection 
Economy and environment are negatively affecting each other; the greater the GDP growth, the greater 
the cost to the environment. With an expected doubling of the GDP per capita by 2020, the outlook for 
the environment looks grim (World Bank, 2012).And even though the non-industrial (service) sector is 
expected to grow in the process towards a high income economy; this does not mean an overall 
diminishment of the contributors to environmental degradation. Furthermore, since China is not able 
to obtain the 'best case scenario' outlined in McKinsey& Company’s abatement projection, the cost of 
environmental degradation is likely to rise. This outlook grows even darker when analyzing the 
government's inability to reach its own emission goals in the last two Five-Year Plans. If the cost of 
environmental degradation is calculated to take a noticeable portion of the GDP, the graph predicts 
that this cost will increase; however, since the cost of environmental degradation is already detracted 
from the GDP and the government is still able to reach high GDP growth numbers, it seems that 
environmental degradation will be more an issue that is secondary in China's priority list. Due to its 
secondary status, the cost of environmental degradation will increase in China's drive for a high-
income society. The drive for sustainability will likely increase when China has reached this high-
income status, though both the social and financial costs will be greater than they are at present. 
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Figure 4.2: Baseline emissions by sector, (McKinsey& Company, 2009) 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This report asked a seemingly straightforward question: will China successfully transform its economy 
from a fixed asset investment and export-led model to a consumption-based model driven by its 
domestic economy? It is a seemingly simple question that would normally be answered with a yes or a 
no; however, analyzing China’s economy has been a daunting and laborious undertaking. Below, we 
outline some of our research methods, explore China’s advantages and disadvantages when it comes to 
its economic transition, provide a conclusion regarding our research question, and offer suggestions on 
future areas of study in this topic area.  
 
Theoretical orientation 
Our research has consisted of straightforward policy analysis. Each chapter utilized different criteria, 
different sets of data, and covered different areas. Each chapter was analyzed independently using the 
same overarching pattern: identify the problem, find a solution, and determine the Chinese 
government’s current policy approach. This process has allowed us to identify the major hurdles and 
choking points in China’s economic transition. We will use the balance of each chapter’s conclusions 
to provide an answer to the overarching question regarding China’s economic transition.  
 
Research constraints 
In order to tackle this question, we were forced to limit our research in several important ways. 
China’s economy is huge, both in terms of geography and scale. In many ways, China is composed of 
several major economies with its gigantic cities and large prefectures. China is a continental economy 
more akin to Europe as a whole rather than any individual country, centralized government 
notwithstanding. This means there are drastic differences between separate geographic regions, 
particularly between the developed eastern seaboard and the mountainous western regions. China’s 
economy is also huge in scale, representing the second largest economy on the planet, and potentially 
even the largest by some metrics based on a recent World Bank study. Even this seventy-page report 
does not do China’s economy justice.  
 
These issues of scope and scale required us to generalize across the country, a tricky proposition in a 
continental economy. To deal with this issue, we focused on macroeconomic policies, financial reform, 
and other major socioeconomic trends rather than drilling down to grassroots-level economic 
processes. That being said, the Shanghai Free Trade Zone pilot scheme was instrumental as it serves as 
a laboratory to observe possible initiatives the Chinese government may implement throughout the 
country in the coming years. The Shanghai pilot scheme is very much a cornerstone of China’s 
economy and things that succeed there are likely to be implemented elsewhere. 
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Another major limitation is the fact that no economy exists in an economic or political vacuum. China 
has a number of economic and political relationships that affect the economy, and many of the issues 
there are completely out of the Chinese government’s control. It is difficult to predict how the world 
will respond to China’s rise, therefore this report focused on the things that were in China’s control 
rather than include possible scenarios involving other countries. This does lead us to wonder if there 
may be major political or social shocks, either domestically or internationally. Protests, often 
involving some of the issues brought up in this report, are a daily occurrence in China. The 
government may be forced to change its policies rapidly in response to these situations. Likewise, an 
international incident, with Japan for example, would also impact China’s economy in ways this report 
could not predict.  
 
Also, there are limitations on the validity of data and clarity of statements made by the Chinese 
government. There were often major discrepancies between different organizational statics, like the 
ones reported by the World Bank versus official figures provided by the Chinese government. Also, 
the Chinese government's modus operandi is traditionally making vague promises that may signal 
policy shifts, but these shifts are only obvious after years of progress. The recent Third Plenum report 
was a prime example of these statements that are currently difficult to decode, but will become clearer 
as the year progresses. This report had no choice but to embrace this issue of unclear or vague 
information in the hopes that even though no specific forecasts could be made, general trends and 
patterns would emerge and allow for at least generalized predictions regarding future trends in China’s 
economy.  
 
Advantages and disadvantages 
In total, this report identified a number of advantages and disadvantages in China’s economic structure 
with regards to the research question. Though often decried by the western world, China’s 
authoritarian governmental structure does allow for quick, concise changes in policy that are dictated 
from the top rather than reached by democratic consensus. Thankfully, based on government reports 
and their agreement with World Bank or IMF suggestions, Chinese leaders at the highest levels seem 
aware of many of the problems facing China’s economy and will be able to decisively dictate changes 
as they see fit. The government’s heavy hand in the economy will allow for a gradual, structural 
approach to solve economic issues and promote growth. 
 
Unfortunately, this same government structure is also a problem lamented regularly in this report. 
Many communist and former communist economies have found that planned economies are inefficient 
and effectively bad for business. Though the Chinese government is responding to this by slowly 
allowing for the liberalization and privatization of its economy, there are other areas, like SOEs, where 
government control has actually increased in strength in recent years. As stated above, China is 
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moving quite slowly when it comes to restructuring its economy, likely based on lessons learned from 
watching Russia transition away from a planned economy after the end of the Cold War. But slow and 
steady may not always win the race. If China is moving too slowly, they risk hampering their 
economic growth in the near term as well as make it more difficult to change course in the long-term.  
 
There is also the very real issue of corruption plaguing China. The national government may be able to 
dictate policy from on high, but if provincial leaders or their subordinates misuse funds, China will not 
be able to meet its goals despite the best wishes of its leaders. The sum of these advantages and 
disadvantages point to a very serious obstacle on the road to reform: a serious disconnect between 
central and local level government leaders. This disconnect is crucial to our conclusion and shall be 
discussed in more detail below.  
 
Research conclusion 
Our research leads us to conclude that the financial market reforms, or at least the government’s 
commitment to these reforms, are sufficient in dealing with the key obstacles in China’s economic 
transition. Even though the financial reforms are a balancing act that has the possibility to derail 
China’s economic drive, the gradual approach and strong grasp in this particular area leads to an 
optimistic outlook. The fear that shadow banking is spiraling out of control is real and present. The 
government, however, is aware of this and its gradual policy might actually be beneficial to the reform 
of the shadow banking system. A hasty policy would lead to a collapse of the private sector while 
sluggish implementation would mean a Chinese debt crisis. Because of the nature of the Chinese state 
(authoritarian) and its awareness of the issues, this report concludes that in the field of financial 
reforms, the government will be able to overcome these obstacles. 
 
The process of making the Chinese economy more market oriented is less ‘clear cut’. While the 
government has announced reforms in this area, past reforms of SOEs have actually made them more 
‘monopolized’ contrary to the goals of the state. In this particular field, it is less a process of 
willingness but rather of ‘ability’. Tentative steps, however, such as market pricing of resources, as 
well as letting a company in Shanghai default show a new form of commitment to market orientation 
reform. This clear sign of a ‘new kind of policy’ under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, demonstrates a 
break with China’s historic lack of commitment to letting the market determine economic outcomes. 
This leads the report to be optimistic about reform and progress in this area. 
 
Even though both market orientation and financial reforms are key in China’s economic transition, the 
important factor that helps China sustain the process is reform in the area of domestic consumption. 
The problem in this area is that China’s support system (e.g., education, etc.) does not support social 
mobility. This leads to a slowdown of the system: college graduates are unable to find jobs that match 
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their education level which leads them to take middle or low paying jobs. This process displaces poor 
and uneducated workers who are trying to make the transition from poverty into a higher income class. 
In the end, this leads to the stifling of middle class growth, which runs counter to China’s ability to 
make the economic transition. Growth in the middle class is what is supposed to be the main driver for 
China’s post-transition model; with people stuck in a lower class, the transition seems to be in dire 
straits.  What makes matters worse is that the government is actually trying to increase the level of 
education in rural areas without linking this to the amount of jobs available for these future graduates. 
This leads the report to be negative on China’s ability to increase domestic consumption and the 
middle class. 
 
On the issue of space and movement of people, a lot is dependent on other fields of reform. The issue 
of real estate in China is, for example, very dependent on reforms in the area of shadow banking. 
Furthermore, this report concludes that urbanization is not a driver for China’s economic transition, 
but rather increases social stability, or social support, for the government’s reform policy. This 
combined with China’s tentative steps in reforms of the hukou policy leads this report to be reasonably 
optimistic on this particular area of reforms. 
 
A detractor to social support, however, is China’s lack of commitment to environmental reforms. As 
opposed to commitments outlined in, for example, the most recent Third Plenum, the government is 
choosing economic progress over a ‘green policy’. Even though this does not affect China’s ability to 
make the transition in the short-term, it will affect China’s socioeconomic state and social support for 
the government. Furthermore, it will determine what China’s future economy will look like since the 
cost of environmental protection and ‘green policy’ in the future will increase exponentially. Social 
policies that have an impact on the population’s public support seem to be improving after a long 
period of decline. This improvement is of relatively less importance than other reform areas but leads 
to a general positive outlook.  
 
A key obstacle, however, is the issue of China’s aging population and its impact on the economy in the 
short-term. Two options to solve this problem are either changing the ‘one-child policy’ or lifting the 
retirement age. Research has shown that only the lifting of the retirement age will be sufficient to 
overcome said obstacles. So far, the government has shown no real commitment to lifting the 
retirement age due to fear of losing social support. Instead, it is focusing on changing the ‘one child 
policy’, clearly the wrong tool for this problem. What leads us to be optimistic is that the Chinese 
government is an autocracy, which means it can implement policies on the short-term without having 
to slog through the bureaucratic process of a democracy. Since the government still has a window of 
opportunity to implement far reaching social policy reforms, this area does not seem a huge obstacle 
for China’s transition. 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
 
P a g e  | 67 
 
The overarching problem that stretches across all fields of reform is the gap between local 
governments and the state. As outlined above, the implementation of reform dictated by central 
government is very dependent on the local governments. These localities, however, show a varying 
degree of commitment or ability to implement said reforms due to issues such as corruption, 
inefficiency, and discrepancies between goals at the central and domestic levels. This leads to the 
conclusion that in some areas it is less a problem of willingness but rather of ability.  
 
Combining the different chapters this report concludes that China will be able to make the transition 
into a more consumer based society. The problem, based on this report's research, might not actually 
be the transition itself, but rather the ability to sustain the end result and even the quality of the end 
result. While the middle class might grow in years to come, many poverty stricken areas will remain 
poor due to the lack of high-income jobs for the highly educated. This creates a very unstable model 
for China's long-term growth not only in the field of macroeconomics, but also in the field of public 
support. Furthermore, the exponential cost rise of the environment leads to a grim outlook on the 
quality of China's transition. With the general public already vehemently criticizing the state of 
China's environment, the government needs to address these issues to create social stability. Added to 
these is the cost of the implementation of social policies, which do not have a priority on the short-
term, but can have severe consequences in the long-term. Combining these costs will create an 
increased strain on China’s post-transition economic model, which leads us to question whether the 
current transition can be classified as 'success'.  
 
Future research 
During the research phase for this report, we identified many different areas of study that might be 
useful for future scholars. As mentioned above, the Chinese government is also quite vague about 
what promises or policies it plans to implement in the near future, as in the Third Plenum. If this report 
was written a year later, it might derive different conclusions based on newly implemented policies or 
future government statements. That being said, there are a number of other academic issues worth 
exploring with regards to China’s economic transition.  
 
In much the same way, this report has a very narrow window of prediction. We focus on short-term 
economic growth trends but there are larger and long-term economic trends that are important to 
analyze. These long-term trends would likely need to include possible political or social changes 
brought about by domestic or international stimuli. The success or implementation of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the Trans-Pacific Partnership might alter China’s economy 
quite drastically. A conflict with Japan or unrest in various parts of the country might also affect social 
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stability and provoke long-term political or social changes that may impact China’s economy or 
politics in various ways.  
 
This report has several times made it clear that large scale economic reforms require a great deal of 
social support. For example, changing China’s retirement age would require a great deal of social 
capital and would upset social stability, meaning the Chinese government is currently unwilling to 
alter this policy. It would be useful to analyze how much social support China’s government has for 
specific areas of economic or political change. Areas that produce a great deal of friction may become 
sizeable problems in the not too distant future.  
 
Finally, since the discrepancy between the national government and the local government is such a 
vital factor in China’s economic success, it will be important to understand how successful local 
governments are in implementing the edicts of national level leaders. Analyzing the amount of 
inefficiency in implementation due to corruption, self-interest, or competing goals would be quite 
useful for many studying China’s economic development.  
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